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Abstract 
The former “Steel Cities” of Sheffield, UK and Pittsburgh, USA have struggled to grow and 
attract a modern, knowledge-based economy.  From the 1970s to early 1980s, their traditional 
manufacturing economies began to breakdown, rendering the economic logic of their industrial 
structures obsolete.  The comparative advantage of OECD cities shifted from physical 
manufacturing to the packaging and generation of knowledge. However, certain characteristics of 
Pittsburgh and Sheffield‟s former manufacturing economies have persisted and hindered their 
economic recovery.  This paper will argue that both Pittsburgh and Sheffield suburbanized very 
early because of their steel industries.  These communities were fragmented geographically and 
economically, and became overly-specialized and dependent on steel.  It will show that policy has 
not adequately addressed these problems and, at times, has succeeded in accentuating them.  
Policy-makers‟ initial reaction to the steel industry‟s decline was to subsidize inefficient mills.  
When the subsidies failed, Pittsburgh and Sheffield had not pursued alternative economic 
development strategies.  The cities suffered a concentrated decrease in employment and general 
economic shock.  The paper will then demonstrate how later economic development plans were 
influenced by the historical relationship between policy-makers and private industry.  The 
varying challenges and failures of these revitalization plans will be analyzed and discussed.  The 
paper argues that Pittsburgh and Sheffield have mistakenly confused the terms „knowledge 
economy‟ and „information technology‟, resulting in a misguided attempt at creating an IT 
economy.  Finally, the effectiveness of current “green economy” revitalization plans will be 
evaluated and placed within a historical context. The paper concludes that the global economy, 
and economic logic of Sheffield and Pittsburgh, was forever changed in the twentieth century. 
The cities‟ efforts to maintain their brand as a world economic leader is unrealistic and, in fact, 
counterproductive to successful, but moderate, economic development.    
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Abstract 
Die ehemaligen “Stahl-Städte“ Sheffield in Großbritannien und Pittsburgh in den USA kämpfen 
um Wachstum und den Aufbau einer modernen, wissensbasierten Wirtschaftsstruktur. In den 
1970iger und frühen 1980er Jahren erlebte deren traditionelle Industrie einen Niedergang, welche 
die ökonomische Logik ihrer industriellen Struktur obsolet werden ließ. Der komparative Vorteil 
von Städten in den OECD-Ländern verschob sich von der alten Industrie zur Konfektionierung 
und zur Wissensgenerierung. Allerdings bestanden bestimmte Eigenschaften der ehemaligen 
Industrie in Pittsburgh und Sheffield weiter und verhinderten einen Wirtschaftsaufschwung in 
diesen Städten. In dieser Arbeit wird dargelegt, dass sowohl in Pittsburgh als auch in Sheffield 
wegen der Stahlindustrie sehr früh eine Suburbanisierung stattgefunden hat. Diese Gemeinden 
waren geographisch und ökonomisch zersplittert, sie wurden zu spezialisiert und abhängig von 
der Stahlindustrie. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Politik diese Probleme nicht adäquat behandelt und 
sie zeitweise sogar verschärft hat. Die erste Reaktion der Politiker auf den Niedergang der 
Stahlindustrie war die Subventionierung der ineffizienten Betriebe. Als die Subventionierung 
scheiterte, verfügten Pittsburgh und Sheffield über keine alternativen ökonomischen 
Entwicklungsstrategien. Die Städte erlitten einen geballten Rückgang der Arbeitslosigkeit und 
einen allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen Schock. Die Masterarbeit zeigt weiter, wie spätere Pläne für 
die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung von den historischen Verbindungen zwischen Politikern und 
Privatindustrie beeinflusst wurden. Die verschiedenen Herausforderungen und Misserfolge 
dieser Revitalisierungspläne werden analysiert und diskutiert. In der Arbeit wird dargelegt, dass 
Pittsburgh und Sheffield irrtümlicherweise die Begriffe „Wissensbasierte Ökonomie“ und 
„Informationstechnologie“ verwechselt haben, was einen fehlgeleiteten Versuch, eine IT-
Wirtschaft aufzubauen,  zur Folge hatte. Schließlich wird die Effektivität von derzeitigen 
Revitalisierungsplänen durch eine „grüne Ökonomie“ evaluiert und im historischen Kontext 
betrachtet. Die Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die globale Wirtschaft und die ökonomische 
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Logik von Sheffield und Pittsburgh im 20. Jahrhundert für immer verändert wurden. Die 
Bemühungen der beiden Städte um das Markenzeichen, weltweit ökonomisch führend zu sein, 
sind unrealistisch, ja kontraproduktiv für eine erfolgreiche, aber moderate, wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung.  
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I. Introduction 
In the second half of the twentieth century, increased integration of the global economy caused 
many OECD nations to lose their comparative advantage in physical manufacturing.1 
Improvements in technology decreased the industries‟ payrolls and better transport allowed a 
greater percentage of manufacturing to be completed by cheaper, foreign labour sources.  
Dominant manufacturing cities in nations such as Germany, the United States, and England, 
experienced economic hardship as employment in their primary industry declined.  
 
Pittsburgh, USA and Sheffield, UK were once world famous for their steel manufacturing-based 
economies.  They were each known by the moniker “Steel City” and, in many ways, Pittsburgh 
and Sheffield were “symbol[s]” of the “spectacular advance of [the manufacturing]…industry.”2  
The cities grew with their respective steel industries into significant economic players, and a large 
portion of their populations were reliant on the industry‟s jobs. When steel industry employment 
declined in Pittsburgh and Sheffield in the 1970s and 80s, the cities‟ main means of existence 
disappeared.  Today, the cities are „world famous‟ for their economic troubles, and they have 
struggled to revitalize their once vibrant economies.  Today, OECD cities‟ economic success is 
based on a new comparative advantage: the production of knowledge.3 
 
 The former dominance of steel manufacturing in Sheffield and Pittsburgh has affected the cities‟ 
ability to be economically successful.  Pittsburgh has fared better than Sheffield in terms of 
                                                          
1
 Parts of this thesis use and build upon dissertation work previously undertaken by the author at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, entitled “Transitioning From Steel to Knowledge: Challenges Faced 
by the Pittsburgh and Sheffield Regions”. Both works are part of a coordinated double degree program funded 
by the European Union’s Erasmus Mundus program.  
2
 Roy Lubove, Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh: Government, Business, and Environmental Change (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969) 2. 
3
 OECD, “Knowledge Economy” (Paris: OECD 1996) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/8/1913021.pdf 
[accessed June 6th, 2008]. 
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economic recovery, but both cities have experienced prolonged economic hardship since the 
decline of their steel industries.  The nature of steel manufacture and its role in the cities‟ 
development left Pittsburgh and Sheffield with certain characteristics that were in opposition to 
the creation of a successful, modern economy.  Additionally, the cities‟ economic development 
policies have failed to address some of these characteristics.  Some of the features of their former 
manufacturing economies, which limit the cultivation of a modern, knowledge-based economy, 
still exist and have often not even been addressed by policy makers. Pittsburgh has been slightly 
more successful in growing its economy because it has corrected some of these negative 
characteristics, while simultaneously building on some of its more positive ones.   
 
Both cities have suffered from the hype of the information technology revolution and the 
misunderstanding of a “knowledge economy” as one focused only on computer technology 
firms.   As a result, few jobs have resulted for former employees of the steel industry.  The recent 
acknowledgement of this mistake has led to new hype for a different type of economic 
revitalization: a „green manufacturing economy‟ that would produce renewable energy for the 
region.  The promoters of this plan hope to encourage the development of skilled, high paying 
jobs, much like those that once existed in the manufacturing economy.  The movement 
symbolizes a hope that pervades former manufacturing regions across the globe; it is the hope 
that they can return once again to their glory days as powerful manufacturers.   
 
This thesis will explore the revitalization efforts of Pittsburgh and Sheffield post steel.  Examples 
of a wider phenomenon, the economic histories of Pittsburgh and Sheffield demonstrate the 
difficulties former manufacturing economies have faced as they struggle to adapt to the changing 
global economy.  The thesis argues that the legacy of the cities‟ respective steel industries has 
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hindered the economic development of Pittsburgh and Sheffield in a “post-manufacturing” 
economic system. 
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II. Transitions in the Twentieth Century Global Economy 
The economic changes that occurred in Pittsburgh and Sheffield were highly correlated to shifts 
in the global economy of the twentieth century.  The cities‟ struggles are representative of a 
larger phenomenon that occurred in advanced economies around the globe. To understand the 
context of Pittsburgh and Sheffield, it helps to trace these global economic transitions.  In the 
period before 1914, Britain was the international economic superpower. The country was the 
first “to industrialize, to adopt the gold standard, and to accept free trade as its commercial 
policy”.4 However, after World War II, the United States surpassed Britain as the leader of the 
world economy. The years between 1950 and 1973 are recognized by economists as “the most 
prosperous of any such period in the history of the world economy.”5 This progress is highly 
correlated to the extreme acceleration in technological progress and applications during this 
period.  From the 1950s to 1960s, the “main players” remained the “industrialized countries of 
Western Europe, Canada, the United States, Japan, and Australia.”6 However, advances in 
technology spread and were efficiently used by new, industrializing powers such as the NICs in 
Asia and countries in South America, like Brazil.  More players entered the market, benefiting 
from the latest technology and offering multinational corporations significantly cheaper labour 
costs.  
 
The manufacturing industries of advanced countries in North America, Britain, and Western 
Europe slowly began shifting towards more service oriented, knowledge- based economies. 
According to Kenwood and Lougheed, “the industrial countries‟ share of world trade in 
                                                          
4
 A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000 (Routledge: New 
York, 1999) 334. 
5
 A.G. Kenwood, 336. 
6
 A.G. Kenwood, 336. 
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manufacturers has fallen since the 1970s as the NICs increase their share.”7  Additionally, the 
average annual growth rate of the world economy fell from 5 to 2.9 per cent between 1973 and 
1980, and experienced further decreases from 1980-90 and 1990-1997.8  In a departure from the 
past, the “leading growth countries of the 1980s were Japan (3.8 per cent), Finland (3.7 per cent), 
and Ireland (3.4 per cent).”9 Simultaneously, rapidly advancing countries such as Singapore (8.2 
per cent), South Korea (7.1 per cent), and Taiwan (6.5 per cent) were experiencing “much higher 
rates of economic growth”.10   The “Gerschenkronian” late developers were able to build 
factories with newer, more efficient processes, employ inexpensive labour, and utilize 
increasingly cheaper transport and communication costs to export their goods around the world. 
In several manufacturing sectors, they began to outperform traditionally advanced economies, 
many of whom were heavily invested in outdated technologies, while simultaneously faced with 
labour disputes and  environmental regulation costs. In addition to loss of market share, 
technological improvements rendered many manufacturing jobs in these countries redundant.  
Firms in advanced economies such as the United States, Germany, and Britain eliminated jobs 
which could now be cheaply performed by machines. More products were able to be produced 
with less manpower, saving firms costs in labour.   
 
The information technology revolution led many to proclaim the wonders of the “new 
knowledge economy” and downplay the importance of location economics.  Downtrodden 
economies were promised that with the introduction of IT technology, their unemployment 
problems would be solved. However, today, many former industrial towns in advanced 
                                                          
7
 A.G. Kenwood 307. 
8
 A.G. Kenwood 307. 
9
 A.G. Kenwood 309 
10
 A.G. Kenwood 309 
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economies are still struggling to attract industry and revitalize their economies.  The dot-com 
bust of the 1990s and recent events have helped foster negative sentiments towards the promises 
of the „knowledge economy‟, leading to a new wave of Keynesian policies and efforts to promote 
the development of a “green economy”.  These changes in the global economy are reflected on a 
micro- level in the experiences of Pittsburgh and Sheffield and will be explored in further detail.  
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III. Changes in the Global Steel Industry 
Steel was the main manufacturing industry of Pittsburgh and Sheffield. The changes in the global 
economy affected not only specific countries, but also global industries. The production and 
main actors of the steel industry changed dramatically over the span of the 20th century.  In 1868, 
the Bessemer steel converter enabled producers to mass manufacture steel for the first time.11  
Steel became a new industry. It “required substantially higher capitalization for entry, replaced 
most uses of iron, and was capable of economies of scale”.12  This change in technology was 
most astutely harnessed by Andrew Carnegie and allowed the United States to take the position 
of Britain and Europe as the leading steel producer.  Carnegie pioneered new advances in 
economies of scale by creating “integrated factories”, in which all operations “were concentrated 
in one factory under centralized management, achiev[ing] economies of scale and speed of 
output that guaranteed large profits”.13 Such methods resulted in the United States‟ establishing 
itself as the world leader of steel manufacturing. The new method of producing steel became so 
profitable that other producers were also driven to adopt it.  In 1911, steel manufacturing shifted 
from Bessemer to open hearth production, but the industry continued to employ large amounts 
of workers and experienced increasing demands during the periods of World War I, World War 
II, and post- World War II reconstruction.14   
 
However, from 1950 to 1975, the United States lost its title of king of steel.  Although the post- 
World War II reconstruction resulted in the European common market nations participating in 
the industry once again, this was not the main cause of the United States‟ woes. In fact, the 
                                                          
11
 Ronald E. Seavoy, An Economic History of the United States: From 1607 to Present (New York: Routledge, 
2006),  247. 
12
 Seavoy, An Economic History of the United States: From 1607 to Present,  247. 
13
 Seavoy, 248. 
14
 Seavoy, 248. 
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common market nations faced many of the same challenges as the US: loss of market share, high 
labour costs, uncompetitive prices, and an overall decrease in demand for steel.   Except for 
decrease in demand, these problems were largely caused by the failure of steel firms in the 
European common market nations and US to invest in new, competitive technologies.  
According to business scholars, “these investments were essential if steel made in integrate steel 
mills…was to be competitive with imported steel in the domestic market”.15  The main 
challenger to American and European common market nations‟ steel industry was Japan.  
Japanese steel producers became very competitive in price and productivity by investing large 
amounts of money into the latest technology.  From 1968 to 1974, Japanese steel  manufacturers 
“invested 14.2 billion dollars; steel producers in common market nations16 invested 14.3 billion 
dollars, and the U.S. steel producers invested 12.0 billion dollars”.17   
 
Furthermore, investments in the U.S. and common market nations were not allocated efficiently 
and did not go towards consistently updating factories with the latest technology. In short, “the 
Japanese advantage in production efficiency can be attributed largely to consistently shrewd 
investment decisions and technological adaptation geared to the rigors of world export market 
standards”.18 More productive and efficient technology gave the Japanese steel industry lower 
labour costs and, ultimately, more competitive pricing. Firms in the United States and European 
common market nations had failed to update their factories‟ technologies, opting instead to 
pocket their profits. Unable to compete with Japanese prices, the United States and common 
                                                          
15
 Seavoy, 300. 
16
 “Common Market Nations” is a term used in the English-speaking world to refer to the European Economic 
Community (EEC), which was created in 1957 and originally consisted of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, but which expanded over time before becoming enveloped under the 
umbrella of European Union, in 1993.  
17
 Seavoy 301.  
18
 Seavoy 301. 
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market nations‟ developed a trigger pricing mechanism agreement, which made Japanese steel 
more expensive within their borders, allowing the countries‟ steel industries the ability to 
compete domestically.19  However, this did not make U.S. or common market countries‟ steel 
industries any more competitive on an international level. In fact, “the long-term effect of 
protection…was to delay restructuring of the steel industry into fewer producers at the best 
locations”.20  
 
Instead of using the profits grained from protections against Japanese imports to update and 
restructure steel manufacture, producers in the United States and common markets pursued  a 
“strategy of diversification” from the 1960s and into the 1980s.  Diversification meant buying 
other non-steel related companies, which were profit-making, to a company‟s portfolio- allowing 
the loss-making steel industry to remain unchanged.   For example, “U.S. Steel acquired 
Marathon Oil Company,…whose profits were invested in petrochemicals while steel production 
was marginally profitable or lost money”.21  According to Seavoy, approximately 15 percent of 
subsidized profits were used for “diversification.”22  Protection from Japan and other countries 
with developing steel industries resulted in high prices.  This resulted in a “substantial advantage 
to Japanese and Korean automobile manufacturers” since the “sheet steel [used]… was 25 to 30 
percent cheaper than steel produced in the United States or European common market 
nations”.23 Any domestic product of the U.S. or European common market nations that was 
made with steel suffered the disadvantage of higher material costs.   
                                                          
19
 Seavoy 303. 
20
 Seavoy 302. 
21
 Seavoy 304. 
22
 Seavoy 304. 
23
 Seavoy 304. 
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Academics have analyzed the decline of the steel industry in the US and UK from two different 
policy perspectives.  According to one viewpoint, government policies which instituted high 
wages, emissions regulations, and protective subsidies disincentivized industrial leaders from 
heavily investing in new equipment and processes.24  From this perspective, government 
interference negatively affected the steel industries of the US and UK.  However, this view is 
challenged by a different argument- namely that the decline of the steel industry was the result of 
too little government regulation.  According to this view, multinational corporations shifted from 
buying and producing steel only in their home countries to buying steel wherever it was cheapest.  
From this perspective, proponents argue that the governments of the UK and US could have 
limited their MNCs‟ ability to relocate their steel purchasing and manufacturing through strong 
regulation.  This could have preserved the US and UK home market share and encouraged the 
firms‟ to update local factories.   
 
Both perspectives agree on one matter: steel industry leaders in the UK and US lacked incentives 
to invest in the new technologies and processes that would make help make their factories 
competitive with industry newcomers in Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America.  Today, 
“there are no national steel industries in the United States, Canada, and the European Union in 
the sense that integrated steel mills within national borders are owned by companies 
headquartered in that nation”.25 New, competitive steel mills are being built in Brazil (which are 
co-financed by firms from Japan, Korea, and the EU) and China.  These mills will be very 
competitive due to low labour costs and new technologies.26  The changes in the steel industry of 
                                                          
24
 Seavoy 303-305. 
25
 Seavoy 304. 
26
 Seavoy 305. 
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the twentieth century, and the United States‟ and the European common market nations‟ 
inability to adapt, resulted in an extreme redundancy in jobs.  These transitions were felt on a 
local level in Pittsburgh and Sheffield. 
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IV. Economic Trends and Figures in Pittsburgh, USA and Sheffield, UK 
When steel manufacture employment declined, the cities of Pittsburgh and Sheffield experienced 
a series of changes.  Pittsburgh and Sheffield each saw their rate of unemployment increase.  
Sheffield‟s unemployment in 1975 was 2%.  In 1981, unemployment was 8% and 38.000 workers 
were unemployed.  Its unemployment rate peaked in 1986 as 17% of the labour pool lacked 
employment. Although these figures track with the overall UK trend, it is important to note that 
“until 1982 Sheffield‟s [unemployment] level remained below the national average [and it] has 
stayed well above it ever since” 27.  In recent times, Sheffield‟s unemployment rate has been 
approximately 6%, while the UK has averaged 5.2%.28  Pittsburgh has experienced similar trends.  
In 1975, it‟s percentage of U.S. unemployment insurance compensation was 1.36%. 29 By 1983, 
its share had nearly doubled to 2.84%.  In 2006, it was 1.55%.30  In recent years, though, 
Pittsburgh‟s unemployment rate, in comparison to the U.S. average, has improved.  In 2007, 
4.3% of the population was unemployed, compared to the U.S. average of 4.64%.31 However, 
this figure may be deceptive since Pittsburgh has annually decreased in population.  
                                                          
27
  Paul Allender, What's Wrong With Labour? (London: Merlin Press, 2001) 98. 
28
 NOMIS Official Labour Market Statistics:  
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/la/2038432027/subreports/pop_time_series/report.aspx? 
[accessed August 2, 2008]. 
29
 U.S. Unemployment Insurance is an accurate indicator for the number of newly unemployed workers eligible 
for temporary unemployment pay.  This figure was used because the data was the most accurate available to 
indicate unemployment trends.  Census data can be problematic because officials have used different units, 
definitions, and methods throughout the years.  Therefore, it is necessary to search for data that has been 
recalculated and harmonized based on the same units, definitions, and methods.  This method of choosing 
appropriate statistics has been used throughout the thesis. 
30
 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis: http://www.bea.gov/regional/remdChart/default.cfm#chart_top 
[accessed August 5, 2008]. 
31
  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.pa_pittsburgh_msa.htm [accessed August 20, 
2008]. 
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Demographically, both cities have seen their population decrease.  Sheffield and Pittsburgh 
suburbanized much earlier than other cities in their nation due to the industrial geography of the 
steel industry.  This geographical trend will be examined in the following chapters. As steel 
employment collapsed in the two cities, there was a marked increase in the rate of people leaving 
the region. In 1980, Pittsburgh‟s city had a population of 423. 959 and its metropolitan area was 
approximated at 2.219.000.  Today, Pittsburgh city has a population of approximately 312, 819 
and its metropolitan area is home to about 2.462.571.  It moved from the 13th most populous 
metropolitan area in 1980 to the 20th in 2000.32 Sheffield had approximately 547. 500 people 
living in its center in 1981.  Today, that population is approximately 525.800 people.  Its 
metropolitan area has a population of approximately 1.819.500.33  
The cities have also underperformed in comparison to their national economies. Sheffield has 
not significantly increased its economic contribution to the UK economy in terms of gross value 
added.  In 1995, Sheffield‟s gross value added was an 88 (with the UK average being measured at 
100).  In 2004, it had increased to only 89.  This is in comparison to Leeds, whose GVA 
increased from 114 in 1995 to 119 in 2004.34  In the past, Pittsburgh has also lagged behind its 
national economy.  From 1970 to 1996, the average rate of job growth in Pittsburgh was 15.6%.  
During the same time span, job growth was 50.6% in heartland urban areas and an average of 
63.9% growth in the nation.35  Such figures should be viewed with some skepticism. Based on 
                                                          
32
 City Data Online Database: http://www.city-data.com/us-cities/The-Northeast/Pittsburgh.html [accessed 
July 14, 2008]. 
33
 NOMIS Official Labour Market Statistics:  
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/la/2038432027/subreports/pop_time_series/report.aspx? 
[accessed August 2, 2008]. 
34
 Office for National Statistics, UK: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/Statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=14650 [accessed 
August 2, 2008]. 
35
 Robert E. Gleeson and Jerry Paytas, “Pittsburgh: Economic Restructuring and Regional Development 
Patterns, 1880-2000,” Sunbelt/Frostbelt: Public Policies and Market Forces in Metropolitan Development, ed. 
Janet Rothenberg Pack (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press: 2005), 192. 
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the percentages alone, it is entirely possible that the majority of the United States was 
underdeveloped (in terms of jobs) before 1970, while Pittsburgh was developed or 
overdeveloped.  Differences in numbers of actual jobs may account for some of the difference 
between the figures, however, the population and unemployment numbers indicate that 
Pittsburgh was struggling economically compared to other urban centers in the United States.  
The economies of Pittsburgh and Sheffield were based heavily on their steel and related 
manufacturing industries.  As the respective cities‟ nations hemorraged jobs in these sectors, the  
composition of employment sectors shifted.  This trend is accurately illustrated by national 
employment sector numbers.36 In 1961, the United Kingdom‟s manufacturing and extractive 
(including metallurgy and coal) industries employed 8.974.000 and 749.000 workers, respectively.  
In 1971, 7.626.000 workers were employed by the manufacturing sector and 261.000 were 
employed by the extractive sector.  These numbers continued to decrease in 1981, with 6.498.000 
working in the manufacturing industry and 354.000 working in the extractive sector. By 1991, the 
numbers had decreased to 5.397.000 and 223.000 respectively.  The last collected figure, in 2001, 
shows 3.597.226 employed by the manufacturing sector and 115.000 employed by the extractive 
sector.  This decline in number of jobs is in contrast to commerce/finance and services sectors. 
In 1961, Britain employed 5.997.000 in the services sector and 3.839.000 in commerce/finance.  
By 2001, the number had increased to 8.737.000 in services and 9.880.000 in commerce/finance.  
From 1961 to 2001, the manufacturing and extractive employment sectors continually lost jobs 
while employment in the services and commerce/finance steadily increased.  
                                                          
36
 As previously noted, it can be problematic to compare census data if the data was collected using difference 
units, definitions, and methods and has yet to be harmonized by census officials.  Local employment by sector 
data for Pittsburgh and Sheffield from 1961 to 2001 has yet to be harmonized.  The information collected by 
the census is based on differing borders and definitions.  The borders of Sheffield city, Sheffield metropolitan, 
South Yorkshire county have changed over time and the censuses differ in whether they use Allegheny county 
as the main unit of measurement or the smaller Pittsburgh metropolitan area.  Additionally, the categories 
used for ‘employment sectors’ also differs. Therefore, the most accurate means of historical comparison are 
harmonized national figures, derived International Historical Statistics.  
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The United States experienced a similar shift in employment.37  In 1960, 19.455.000 and 714.000 
workers were employed in the manufacturing and extractive sectors, respectively.  In 1970, these 
numbers had decreased to 23.143.000 and 532.000.  By 1980, 24.973.000 and 1.003.000. 1990, 
22.463.000 and 766.  1995, 21.333.000 and 707.000.  While the decrease in employment in the 
manufacturing and extractive services does not seem as stark as Britain, the sectors‟ numbers 
appear stagnant and disappointing when compared to the growth in U.S. services and commerce.  
In 1960, 19.060.000 workers were employed in services and 15.032.000 were working in the 
commerce/finance sector.   By 1995, these figures had jumped to 45.083.000 and 42.035.000 
workers, respectively.  The categories of “manufacturing” and “extractive” are not exclusive to 
the steel industries and include a wide variety of industries such as the automotive, coal, textile, 
and software sectors.  This introduces a certain amount of confusion into the numbers when 
discussing steel and related industries.  While there remains much ambiguity in the employment 
categories, the figures nevertheless support the assertion that the dominance of the extractive 
and manufacturing industries, in terms of employment numbers, decreased while that of the 
service and finance/commerce sectors increased.  
The figures also raise an interesting point on the role of gender on employment numbers and 
sectors. In both the US and the UK, very few women, in comparison to men, were employed in 
the extractive industry.  In 1961, the UK employed 728.000 men and 21.000 females in the 
extractive industry (which includes metallurgy).  In 2001, 104.000 men and 11.000 women work 
in the extractive industry.  The decrease in employment for men was significantly sharper than 
                                                          
37
 As previously noted, it can be problematic to compare census data if the data was collected using difference 
units, definitions, and methods.  Local employment by sector data for Pittsburgh and Sheffield from 1961 to 
2001 has yet to be harmonized.  The information collected by the census is based on differing borders.  The 
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female employment.  In the manufacturing industry, the UK employed 6.308.000 men and 
2.666.000 women in 1961.  By 2001,  3.596.000 men and 1.226.000 women worked in the 
manufacturing sector.  Unlike the extractive sector, the decrease in male and female employment 
in this sector was more even. The UK services industry employed approximately 3.136.000 men 
and 2.861.000 women in 1961.  By 2001, 2.952.000 men and 5.785.000 women worked in the 
sector. In this situation, employment actually decreased for the male workforce, while increasing 
for the female worker.  Literature on Sheffield and Pittsburgh‟s economic struggles have referred 
to this “feminizing” of the service sector workforce, as male employment declined and female 
employment increased.  The US experienced a similar change in the gender of the workforce 
(please refer to figure for further elaboration).  Significant changes in terms of population, 
gender, employment sectors, and unemployment rates occurred as Pittsburgh and Sheffield‟s 
steel industry employment declined.  
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                          Male Unemployment in Sheffield and England and Wales 
                                      Source: A Vision of Britain Through Time38 
 
                   Population Change in Sheffield and England and Wales 
     Source: A Vision of Britain Through Time39 
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Source: International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2000.42 
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Sources: Source: International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-200046 and International 
Historical Statistics: Europe 1750- 2000 47  
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V. Theoretical Perspectives: Economic Cycles and the Steel Industry 
Some economists and economic historians have argued that the previously described changes of 
the global economy and steel industry can be explained by economic cycles theory and research.   
There are several types of economic cycle theories.  However, this thesis will focus on 
kondriatiev or long waves- perhaps the most interesting when applied to the discussion at hand. 
The theory is used by two differing schools of economic thought and is a useful tool in not only 
periodizing the decline of Pittsburgh and Sheffield‟s steel-based economies, but also 
understanding the significant relationship between technological changes and societal/economic 
structure.  
 In 1925, the USSR economist Nikolai Kondratiev (of whom the waves are named after) 
published a book entitled The Major Economic Cycles, which argued that the modern global 
economy experiences extended, alternating high and slow growth cycles of approximately fifty 
years.48  Kondratiev‟s observation inspired the work of Schumpeter in the struggling 1930s and 
several Marxist scholars in the more economically prosperous 1960s.  Schumpeter and his 
colleagues focused on “the central role of technical progress, in providing opportunities for 
profits and accumulation” and held that upspring periods were facilitated by the emergence of a 
cluster of key innovations.49    Gerhard Mensch went on further to hypothesize that such clusters 
emerge because “depressions make entrepreneurs more adventurous” and willing to experiment 
and take risks with their innovations.50  Prominent Marxist scholars, such as Ernest Mandal, 
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argue that “long waves occur because of the inherent tendency in capitalism for the rate of profit 
to fall”.51  Additionally, they argue that exogenous factors such as “imperial expansion, the 
discovery of new natural resources, or the suppression of labour movements” are what allow 
recovery to occur.52  Kondratiev or long waves has been met with skepticism by many current 
mainstream economists.  Amongst other criticisms, critics argue that several historical economic 
events were not inevitable, as wave theory may suggest, and that Kondratiev selectively excluded 
data that did not prove his theory.  Regardless of these criticisms, the conception of long waves 
remains useful when periodizing and organizing economic history.   
Scholars envision that five Kondratiev waves have occurred in modern history. These periods 
can be summarized briefly as The British Industrial Revolution: The Age of Cotton, Iron, and 
Water Power, beginning in the 1770s; The Second Kondratiev Wave: The Age of Iron Railways, 
Steam Power, and Mechanization, beginning in 1829; The Third Kondratiev Wave: The Age of 
Steel, Heavy Engineering, and Electrification beginning in 1875; The Fourth Kondratiev Wave: 
The Great Depression and the Age of Oil, Automobiles and Mass Production beginning in 1908; 
The Fifth Kondratiev Wave: The Age of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
beginning in 1971.53  
Long wave enthusiasts hold that “economic growth as we have experienced it needs to be 
understood in terms of a sequence of eras”.  Furthermore, “each era is marked by a cluster of 
technologies, whose progressive development drives experienced economic growth”.54  Such 
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broad generalizations beg the question as to why some countries dominate economically during a 
wave, while others lose economic power or fail to particpate.  One explanation “why certain 
countries have been the leaders in different economic eras is that the various subsystems there fit 
together better to provide a supporting overall structure for the key technologies than was the 
case of institutions in other countries”.55  This provides a reason for why changes in 
technological eras often coincide with shifts in global economic power.  Immanuel Wallerstein 
examines such subsystems and shifts in power when discussing the economic hegemony of the 
United States in the mid-twentieth century.56 According to Wallerstein, the root of United States‟ 
hegemony was its “ability… in the postwar period to produce efficiently, cheaply, and with 
quality and therefore outsell other major industrial producers even in the home markets”.57  
 This ability decreased starting in the 1960s as world political conditions changed and transport 
and communication costs decreased.58   Countries which had previously been consumers of 
American products like steel, began to produce their own products and, later, export to the 
United States.  These products were made with newer technologies, cheaper labour costs, and/or 
more efficient machines.  If an effort to lower costs and maximize profit, many multinational 
corporations intentionally shifted their steel purchases or related manufacturing to “so-called 
newly industrializing countries…in which the workforce receives less renumeration.”59  There 
was a great shift in the location of steel production:  
 
In 1900, the USA was producing 37% of the world‟s steel. With post war industrial 
development in Asia that region now (at the turn of the century) accounts for almost 
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40%, with Europe (including the former Soviet Union) producing 36% and North 
America 14.5%.60 
 
Employment in the steel industry 1974, 1990 and 1996-2000 61 
Thousand at end of year 
(1) Includes former German Democratic Republic 1996-2000 (2) Serbia and Montenegro 1996-2000 Totals are rounded. United States 
figures are average for 12 months. Various other differences in coverage and definition exist, so that inter-country comparisons are of 
dubious value. E indicates estimate.  
Country 1974 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Austria 44 21 13 12 12 12 12 
Belgium 64 26 23 21 20 20 20 
Denmark 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland 12 10 7 7 8 7 8 
France 158 46 39 38 38 38 39 
FR Germany (1) 232 125 86 82 80 78 77 
Greece 0 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Ireland 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 96 56 39 37 39 39 39 
Luxembourg 23 9 5 5 4 4 4 
Netherlands 25 17 12 12 12 12 12 
Portugal 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
Spain 89 36 24 23 22 22 22 
Sweden 50 26 14 14 14 13 13 
United Kingdom 197 51 37 36 34 31 29 
European Union 996 434 306 293 290 280 278 
Yugoslavia (2) 42 69 17 17 17 15 15E 
Canada 77 53 53 53 55 57 56 
United States 521 204 167 163 160 153 151 
Brazil 118 115 79 74 63 59 63 
South Africa 100 112 71 70 61 54 47 
Japan 459 305 240 230 221 208 197 
Republic of Korea n/a 67 66 64 59 58 57 
Australia 42 30 21 20 20 24 21E 
Total of above 2335 1388 1019 985 946 908 885 
 
       
 
 
Pittsburgh and Sheffield were also greatly affected by the changing demand for steel throughout 
the twentieth century. In particular, periods of industrialization and post-war reconstruction 
created huge surges in steel demand and production.  The demand for steel “strongly reflects 
major economic forces, as well as major political upheavals”.62  Demand for steel tends to 
“increase when economies are growing [and] as governments invest in infrastructure and 
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transport and build new factories and houses”.63  The steel boom of post World II represents 
this trend.  Additionally, when economies go into recession, there also tends be a similar “dip in 
steel production as such investments falter”.64  The 1970s was a period of economic decline for 
the UK and the US.  During this period, the intense demands for steel subsided, steel production 
followed in suit.   
However, this is not to suggest that demand for steel remained in permanent decline.  Economic 
cycles theory argues only that there are high and low periods of economic activity and steel 
demand.  The use of steel has been on a general incline,  from “28 million tons at the beginning 
of the 20th century to 780 million tons” by the year 2000.65  This trend suggests the long term 
decline of the Pittsburgh and Sheffield steel industries was not due simply to a temporary 
decrease in demand.  Rather, several factors, as previously discussed, converged simultaneously 
on the unprepared economies of Pittsburgh and Sheffield.  Global changes in steel production 
and demand, as well as the introduction of new technological paradigm (information and 
communication technology) rendered many of Pittsburgh and Sheffield‟s institutions 
economically obsolete. 
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VI. Key Features of the Steel Manufacturing Economy and its Effects on the Cities‟ 
Structures 
The present economic challenges of Pittsburgh and Sheffield are highly connected to their past 
identities as “Steel Cities”.  The cities grew with their steel industries, and a deeply intertwined 
relationship developed between the steel manufacturing industry and the formation of the cities 
and their institutions.  
Geography played an important role in the development of the traditional, manufacturing 
economy.  Like other manufacturing industries, steel required certain topographical features and 
natural resources for its production. This need influenced the industry‟s location decisions. The 
city‟s other inherent geographical qualities, such as its level of connectivity to other regional 
hubs, helped determine the availability of other business and cultural resources.  Additionally, the 
simultaneous growth of steel manufacture and the cities of Pittsburgh and Sheffield influenced 
the spatial and economic organization of the cities. Together, these characteristics comprised a 
city structure whose logic was heavily dependent on the industry which helped build it.  
a. Sheffield‟s Natural Features and the Beginnings of its Steel Industry 
Sheffield is located in the metropolitan county of South Yorkshire in Northern England.  The 
region‟s natural resources provided the early iron and steel industries with several key inputs; 
“deep wood valleys provided charcoal for smelting, fuel for forges,… exposed hill brows 
[for]…smelting sites, and…sandstones [for] excellent grindstones”.66  Famed Sheffield historian, 
Sidney Pollard, recounts that the town was “built on a number of steep slopes, descending from 
the spurs of the high moors to the west and north towards sharply defined valleys and their 
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rivers, on which so much of Sheffield‟s industrial history depends”.67  The sharp valleys into 
which the rivers descended were responsible for the consistent waterfalls and rapids that 
attracted Sheffield‟s first industry, cutlery manufacturing.  According to the 1956 Scientific and 
Historical survey of Sheffield, “the abundance of water-power and its relative cheapness… 
favoured the localization of the cutlery trades in the Sheffield region” and promoted the 
formation of a cluster of highly skilled and specialized metal craft workers.68  Although early 
cutlery firms were small in number of employees and product produced, “their aggregate 
demand for the raw material of their trades was [an] important…reason for the rise of the steel 
industry and its expansion in this area.”69  The hilly terrain and lack of navigable rivers kept early 
Sheffield in relative isolation and cut off from wider trade.70  Local demand for raw materials 
fueled the early growth of the steel industry.71 
The natural physical features of Sheffield helped attract and grow its steel industry, but the 
geographic isolation of the region prevented Sheffield from developing an economic base wider 
than the production of steel and cutlery.72  The region‟s adaptation to its geography caused 
demand for improved transport and communications to be considerably delayed.73  As late as the 
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18th century, the importance of its trade outside the immediate region was characterized as 
“inconsiderable, confined, and precarious” due to the considerable efforts required to reach the 
city; it was approximately at this time, when towns such as Manchester were booming, that the 
dismal condition of Sheffield‟s transportation was “realized to be a serious handicap”. 74   
By the end of the 19th century, the city “appeared to have overcome disadvantages of its 
position.75 But despite the creation of better transport services, the early years of Sheffield 
isolation proved to be a determining force in the path of the city‟s development.  During the 
years Sheffield remained cordoned off from the greater part of British commerce and politics, 
other regional cities had expanded and developed expertise in key areas.  Although Sheffield was 
conferred city status in 1893, it was (and is still) unable to “rival the financial and commercial 
facilities of cities like Leeds, Manchester, and Nottingham which have been centres of trade for 
wide regions [for well over]…two centuries”.76  In addition to lacking the aptitude to be a trade- 
powerhouse, the previously isolated Sheffield did not have the “administrative, legal, and 
clerical” gravitas that many of the older towns like Lincoln and York possessed.77  
b. Pittsburgh‟s Natural Features and the Beginnings of its Steel Industry 
Pittsburgh is located in Allegheny County and is a part of Pennsylvania State, in the Midwestern 
region of the United States. In many senses, the topography of Pittsburgh echoes that of 
Sheffield. Like Sheffield, Pittsburgh is in the center of a region characterized by rivers, valleys, 
and slopes.  In contrast to the geographic isolation of Sheffield, however, Pittsburgh was first 
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settled and developed because of its excellent, navigable rivers.  Captain William Trent, of the 
Virginia militia, laid out the first plans for a fort when his company came upon the site on 
February 17, 1754.  The land was fought over by British and French forces, until it came under 
American Brigadier General John Forbes in 1758; it was renamed „Fort Pitt‟.”78  The 
“navigability of the two rivers, the Allegheny and the Monogahel, which converge at Pittsburgh 
to form the Ohio, ha[s] been generally recognized as…[a key] determinant of the…major 
industry of the region”: steel.79    Before the Civil War and the age of steel, “the region served as 
a major trade entrepot for markets to the west and south.  Ready access to raw materials such as 
coal and timber soon fostered industrial activity: iron-smelting, metals fabrication, textiles, boat 
building, and the manufacture of glass stone-clay products.”80  With the rise of the railroad, 
Pittsburgh found the “locational advantage” of its trading market obsolete as water trade became 
less relevant to the ever westward-expanding nation.  Instead, the city “responded with a 
maximum exploitation of its competitive superiority in raw materials (notably mineral fuels) 
needed for heavy industry”.81  
According to Pittsburgh scholar, Roy Lubove, the “Pittsburgh region‟s preeminence in iron and 
steel production after the 1880‟s was inseparable from the adoption of coke as the chief iron-
smelting fuel.”82  Unlike other cities eager to enter the booming manufacturing sector, Pittsburgh 
offered its industrialists and their factories close proximity to the nearby Connellsville coke 
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fields, “whose beehive ovens produced the best metallurgical coke in the United States.”83  The 
Connellsville coke fields‟ short distance from Pittsburgh allowed iron and steel manufacturers to 
maintain low coke transport costs and, consequently, iron and steel prices that were unbeatable.  
Only with the 20th century invention of the by-product coke ovens, which were cheaper “when 
situated near the furnaces rather than the mines,” did the Pittsburgh region lose its locational 
comparative advantage.84   
The early industry and natural resources of Pittsburgh attracted and fostered the dominance of 
the steel industry in the region.  However, Pittsburgh‟s development as a regional hub was not 
stunted by its geography.  Although Pittsburgh‟s economy was centered on steel, its history as a 
regional trading post also caused corporations like Heinz and Alcoa to base their operations in 
Pittsburgh.  By the second half of the twentieth century, Pittsburgh was a highly desired location 
for Fortune 500 companies in the United States.85  Additionally, the presence of wealthy 
corporate leaders may have increase the likelihood of philanthropy in the city.86  Pittsburgh‟s 
steel magnate Andrew Carnegie and his heirs created multiple charitable entities, museums, and 
educational institutions.87 The prestigious Carnegie Mellon University was initially started by 
Andrew Carnegie.  The city benefited from its business connections by receiving a significant 
amount of philanthropy.   
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c. The Effect of Steel on the Spatial and Economic Organization of Cities 
While the natural topography and resources of the regions influenced the early formation of their 
steel industries, steel production in turn affected the spatial composition of the Pittsburgh and 
Sheffield regions.  The steel mills “required flat land, abundant water supplies, and good 
transport facilities”. 88  In Sheffield, the metal-working industry had claimed the flat land near the 
center of the city at an earlier date. As there was no suitable land left available near the center, 
the steelworks built their mills to the east of Sheffield. This area is called the Don Valley, and it 
“offered [the steel mills]…unlimited opportunities for industry and canal construction”.89 In 
Pittsburgh, the prolific amount of hills and valleys meant that flat land near the river was also a 
rare commodity.  Steel factories were quickly built along the scarce flat land, leaving little land for 
workers‟ housing.   
During the Second Industrial Revolution, between 1880 and 1920, steel demand dramatically 
increased.  This increase caused the industrial capacity and population of the America‟s „Steel 
City‟ to soar.90  In addition to greater demand, the extensive mergers of the 1890s and 1900s 
“created unprecedented concentrations of corporate capital”.  These mergers “allowed steel 
companies to exploit new minimum efficiencies of scale in production by building new facilities 
that dwarfed the region‟s early iron mill sites”.91  The geographical limits put on the expansion of 
towns along the river “induced the industrialists of Pittsburgh to seek other locations for plants, 
thereby starting a half century of industrial development in the natural valleys which crisscross 
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the county.”92   Reacting to the steel boom, Sheffield‟s mills also expanded further along the 
prized flat land bordering the river, leading construction of new mill further away from the 
center of the town. 
By expanding along rivers that led outside the city center, steel manufacturing caused Sheffield 
and Pittsburgh to develop a suburbanized spatial pattern that lacked a densely populated core. By 
the late 1800s, Sheffield‟s “eastern townships of Brightside and Attercliffe, [located outside the 
city center], experienced rapid growth because of the expansion of heavy industries.”93  In the 
early twentieth century, the “exodus from the central part of Sheffield outward to the suburban 
areas lying to the south, west, and north” continued.94  As a general trend, “outlying areas gained 
inhabitants, while the central section suffered a loss in population”.95  
Up until approximately 1880, the Pittsburgh region was characterized by a “dense, urban core 
inside the city…and a series of small river towns.”96 After this date, “population in [Allegheny] 
county outside Pittsburgh…[began] increasing faster than that in city”.  This was “in spite of the 
fact that the Pittsburgh population…[was] increased by successive annexations from the 
county.”97 By the 1930s, in “population of county area outside the large city, Allegheny rank[ed] 
second only to Los Angeles County.98  Pittsburgh suburbanized well before the popular 
suburban movement of post- World War II.  By 1960, the city had met “much of the initial 
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„demand‟ for suburbanization…[and] sixty-three percent of the population resided outside the 
central city”.99  Pittsburgh became increasingly devoid of a dense, well-connected core and 
economically intertwined with the industrial geography of steel manufacturing. 
Poor conditions in steel mill towns may have also encouraged suburbanization. The individual 
mill town was extremely dense in population and suffering from poor urban planning.  In Jeff 
Kleinberg‟s book entitled “The Shadow of the Mills”, he recounts that: 
as industry required more land, families of the millworkers…squeezed into the remnants, 
interspersed with the works or perched onto the hillsides above them. Pittsburgh‟s 
topography complicated workers‟ housing: the steep hills placed a premium on flat land 
for industrial development, and industrial expansion left little room for dwellings. Thus 
mills preempted prime building land, leading one steelworker to believe that laboring 
families paid high rents for poor accommodations because “the available building ground 
except in the elevated portions is all occupied”.100 
Density of population varied significantly between “the industrial and nonindustrial sections of 
the city and the richer and poorer wards”.101  For example, the Hill district of Pittsburgh, which 
housed a large portion of the city‟s African American population, boasted a density of 137.3 
people per acre in 1890.  This is in contrast to the middle to upper class Fourth Ward district, 
which remained three times less dense.102  Housing for the working class failed to improve, 
despite calls from labour advocates.  Company housing was rare, and leaders viewed such 
concerns as out of their purview.103 
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  In addition to cramped quarters, residents of Sheffield and Pittsburgh‟s teeming mill towns 
were subjected to incredibly poor air quality.  The by-products from the mills created large 
quantities of smog and soot-filled air which became trapped in the valleys where workers homes 
were situated.  “Dirt and noise were inseparable adjuncts to life in a mill district” and local 
residents suffered from high rates of diseases like pneumonia.104The poor living conditions, 
accentuated by the placement of the mills in valleys, probably served as “special impetus…[to] 
the suburban trend”.  Oftentimes, the smoke and fog of the steel mills and river valleys…[could] 
be escaped by going a few miles distant into the higher land.”105 
This process of regional fragmentation was particularly harsh in Pittsburgh. The expansion of 
mills into the river valleys, created a fragmented, pinwheel-shaped city- a spatial pattern which 
still exists today.106  This had several effects on the region.  First, the spatial pattern resulted in 
isolated pockets of populations.  In contrast to a dense core, the pinwheel pattern placed mills 
along winding rivers and between tall hills, essentially isolating populations by jurisdictional and 
topographic barriers. In terms of constructing infrastructure, it was easier to build roads radiating 
from the downtown to the individual mill towns than invest in the construction of 
“circumferential connections” that would better unite the separated towns.107   
d. Over-specialization of the Economy  
The final feature of the steel manufacturing economy is the cities‟ overspecialization in the 
industry and their subsequent dependence on the sector.  Although their regional econom[ies] 
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had once been quite balanced,” Pittsburgh and Sheffield came to be dominated by steel.108 As 
early as the 1900s, Pittsburgh “had developed an economic mix that distinguished it from most 
other metropolitan areas- an overspecialization in a limited labour force in large plants associated 
with its specialties”.109 This over-specialization had several lasting effects on the Pittsburgh 
region and its structure.  First, large segments of the population became economically dependent 
on a single industry and, in the case of mill towns, a single factory.  Second, the population 
became increasingly segregated by class, immigration-status, and ethnicity.  As the industry 
expanded, it was able to create greater divisions of labour.  Additionally, “technological 
innovation…reduced both costs and the industry‟s dependence upon skilled labour”.110  
Consequently, it became easier to divide the “labour force between skilled and unskilled” as the 
numbers of unskilled workers greatly increased.111  Combined with Pittsburgh‟s high levels of 
immigration, this led to a highly fragmented region with alternating sections of prosperity and 
poverty.112  Immigrants filled many of the unskilled positions, while being given little opportunity 
by the mill for upward mobility.  Owners and managers believed that “ethnic segregation in the 
mills was „quite natural‟” and it helped discourage the formation of united labour unions or 
advocacy groups.113 Sheffield‟s economy also became overspecialized and highly dependent on 
steel.  It followed many of the same economic trends, but experienced little ethnic tension 
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because of the homogenizing effect of its geographical isolation.114  Sheffield did not experience 
significant immigration till the 1970s wave of Asian immigration. However, there was conflict 
between skilled and semi-skilled or unskilled workers because of the technological changes in the 
industry.  Improvements in technology made many skilled and semi-skilled jobs unnecessary, 
allowing companies to pay lower wages to unskilled workers.115 The power of Sheffield‟s 
prominent skilled labour unions began to be challenged as companies hired greater numbers of 
unskilled, non-unionized workers.  
The industrial geography of the steel industry and its effects on the spatial and economic 
organization of Pittsburgh and Sheffield caused the cities to develop an overspecialized and 
dependent relationship with steel manufacturing.  When steel industry employment later 
declined, it would leave both cities with a structure devoid of its unifying thread.  
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VII. The Effects of Steel Subsidies 
By the time their steel industries began to show signs of decline in the late 1960s, Pittsburgh and 
Sheffield were structurally intertwined with their steel production.  Recognizing this fact, policy 
makers were eager to preserve the industry.  Hoping that their local steel industries would 
recover as they had in previous 19th and 20th century lows, policy-makers decided to subsidize the 
struggling steel mills. However, the restructuring of the steel industry- and the massive reduction 
in employment- would prove permanent. Rather than rescue a struggling industry, the 
unsuccessful subsidies caused local economies to continue to operate on a failing socio-
economic structure without pursuing other sources of economic development.  Subsidies 
protected Pittsburgh and Sheffield from changes in the global economy for years.  As a result, 
they suffered acute economic restructuring when such economic protections failed.  The sudden, 
dramatic losses in employment and population that resulted when subsidies were stopped 
increased the difficulty of economic recovery for Pittsburgh and Sheffield.  
a. Sheffield 
The subsidizing of Sheffield‟s local steel industry was done on a national level. In 1967, Britain 
made the decision to nationalize steel production.116  Lead by the Labour government, the 
nationalization of the British steel industry was a reaction to its decrease in competiveness on a 
global scale.  The Labour party was “convinced that the private steel companies were not doing 
enough to restructure the industry”.117  Aggressive investment in new technologies was 
desperately needed to keep British steel competitive with the new players, like Japan, on the 
world market.  This problem of dwindling reinvestment within well-established industries with 
large market share was previously addressed in the discussion on Schumpeter‟s Industry Life 
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Cycle hypothesis and Gerhard Mensch‟s Theory of the Long Wave.  In short, as industries 
mature and fewer companies share the market, firms consequently expand and heavily invest in 
the prevailing technology.  As time and commitment increases, firms are increasingly inflexible 
and have less incentive to take risks and make significant investments. This pattern of behavior 
occurred in both the British and U.S. Steel industries.   
The British government believed that the nationalization of steel would result in a temporary 
cessation individual firms‟ short term mindsets and instead encourage a nationwide coordinated 
effort to heavily invest in new production technologies.  The British Steel Corporation was 
created from a “merger of fourteen major companies and their 200 or so subsidiaries.”118  The 
act would fragment Sheffield‟s steel industry, leaving some plants private and others newly 
nationalized. The government constructed a “three million pound development plan…-the 
largest capital investment program in British history- [and] aimed to boost BSC‟s annual output 
to 36-8 million tonnes by 1983”.119 However, the British government had not planned on world 
steel demand drastically falling.  The capital campaign is considered in retrospect as “one of the 
most ill-timed blunders in British industrial history”.120   
The British government nationalized a series of struggling steel companies.  According to a 1967 
business analysis, “companies taken over by the BSC…made a collective profit of 9 million 
pounds after tax” in the year before they were nationalized.121 To put this profit in context, the 
amount was considered “a miserable return for a group of major steel companies, which the 
government itself value[d] for compensation purposes at between 500 and 600 million 
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pounds”.122  The government made the noble effort to save the local mills of each town, 
regardless of their inefficiency and out-dated technologies.  This plan might have worked save 
the unexpected crash steel demand and price.  An alternative strategy would have been to 
gradually close inefficient mills and only invest in and expand the most promising ones.  This 
would have allowed workers the time and opportunity to relocate to regions with thriving 
factories. However, such actions are rarely politically popular.  While private business is 
constrained by their short term concern of profit margins, elected governments are often 
restricted by concern for public approval and reelection. Under such circumstances, it is easy to 
understand the actions of the British government. 
After the fall in steel demand, the BSC was forced to drastically restructure its industry.  Within a 
few years, drastic unemployment hit Sheffield. Within the time span of three years, from 1978 to 
1981, the Sheffield region lost 18,700 jobs. In 1981, a total of 38.000 people in Sheffield were 
jobless, with “12.000 [having been] made redundant” in that year alone.123  The “suddenness 
and…rather late development” of Sheffield‟s restructuring was more extreme than other parts of 
Northern England.  This was due to the concentrated number of steel mills in the city and local 
labour‟s success at keeping inefficient mills open and employing local workers.124  In Sheffield, 
there was “a widespread belief in …the continuing resilience of the long-established „dual 
economy‟ of cutlery and steel”.125  But by 1979, Sheffield “witnessed  a rapid sequence of steel-
plant restructuring and closure, with a massive hemorrhaging of jobs and…within a matter of 
months, the symbolic razing to the ground of the works that had dominated” the Sheffield 
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region.126  Sheffield‟s citizens “fell into a poverty for which they had not been culturally or 
politically prepared for in the 1970s.127 The nationalization of Sheffield‟s steel production 
extended the life of many unprofitable mills, but in the long run, gifted the region with an 
exaggerated rate of unemployment and a harsh shock to its economic, political, and social fabric. 
b. Pittsburgh 
While Pittsburgh‟s steel mills also received forms of protection and subsidies from the national 
government, the industry was not nationalized.  In contrast to Sheffield‟s situation, many of 
Pittsburgh‟s significant steel subsidies came from the state and local governments.   Pittsburgh 
state and local leaders made considerable efforts to “counterbalance the growing trend to 
relocate manufacturing away from older urban regions such as Pittsburgh”.128 Their main 
weapon in this effort was low-interest financing.  The state of Pennsylvania created the 
Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority (PIDA), which lent “$106.8 million to ninety-six 
projects to six counties”, including Pittsburgh‟s Allegheny County.129  Additionally, Allegheny 
created its own development financing entity called the Allegheny County Industrial 
Development Authority (ACIDA) in 1970.  From 1970 to 1980,  the ACIDA became “the 
region‟s most aggressive source of development capital by packaging $647 million in low-interest 
loans.”130 Significantly, over 50% of all the state and local financing “was used by steel-related 
companies to defray the costs of meeting Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for 
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air quality in order to retain their mills in the region”.  According to Gleeson and Paytas, the low-
interest loans “were essential in maintaining the viability of many industrial plants.”131 
However, this delicate economic balance was too difficult to maintain.  The region‟s extensive 
system of subsidies collapsed in the early 1970s. Low-interest financing programs had kept 
Pittsburgh‟s steel jobs sheltered from restructuring of the market.   When Pittsburgh‟s program 
of subsidies failed, the region was hit with an intense restructuring of their economy.  “The 
suddenness of Pittsburgh‟s economic restructuring was unexpected by most local actors, both 
public and private.”132  In comparison to the findings of the Pittsburgh Regional Economic 
Strategy report of 1963, “the scale and scope of restructuring exceeded even the most dire 
predictions”.133  Between 1970 and 1990, approximately 157.000 manufacturing jobs left 
Pittsburgh.  However, “more than half of these losses occurred between 1979 and 1984".134  The 
state and local subsidies promoted a situation in which the fall of the steel market was 
particularly sudden and harsh.  This led Pittsburgh with little time to adapt to the demands of the 
newly emerging economy.  
When the subsidies supporting the factories of Pittsburgh and Sheffield failed, the regions 
experienced a concentrated drop in unemployment, while simultaneously possessing very few 
alternative sources of work.  By subsidizing the steel industries of Pittsburgh and Sheffield, 
politicians successfully helped support an industry that was a key provider of local jobs.  
However, the subsidy programs created little incentive for workers to relocate to other regions 
with job opportunities or retrain in another field. Likewise, corporations were not as motivated 
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to critically review their operations and reinvest in infrastructure.  Politicians and city planners 
hoped that subsidies would succeed in protecting the steel industry and did not actively pursue 
alternative development plans. As an unfortunate consequence, Pittsburgh and Sheffield were 
acutely “unprepared…for the new circumstances of global competition”.135 
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VIII. Post Steel 
A radical change of technology…changes the regime of accumulation, but it does nothing to make the mode of 
regulation change in harmony.  It is likely- one might say inevitable- that the necessary harmony will be lost, 
and that this will cause a crisis, and a depression.136 
When it became clear that no amount of subsidies would bring back the lost steel and broader 
manufacturing jobs of Sheffield and Pittsburgh, their respective city councils looked for 
solutions to reverse the high rate of unemployment.  The historical relationship between local 
policy-makers and the steel industry affected the cities‟ early actions to revitalize their region. 
Sheffield‟s City Council had very little experience in cooperatively working with private industry.  
In the troublesome years following the decline of steel employment, Sheffield policy-makers 
pursued economic solutions that were focused on culture and public infrastructure.  While well-
intentioned, many of these investments had very little potential for job creation and did not build 
upon existing strengths in the community. Conversely, Pittsburgh‟s local political leaders had a 
long history of working with industrial elites on local development issues.  However, these 
industry leaders were primarily focused on Pittsburgh as a „Steel City‟ and early planning 
decisions were often blind to the larger trends occurring in the global economy.  They failed to 
fix some of the former-manufacturing economy‟s spatial hindrances, but their early economic 
development plans built upon the city‟s assets and existing private industries.  
a. History of Sheffield Policy Makers and Development 
Before the decline of its steel industry, Sheffield had completed several urban development 
projects.  Most of these were solely funded and conducted by the local government.  Around the 
turn of the century, Sheffield‟s city leaders administered a series of urban improvements.  The 
city council municipalized monopolies like the water and gas companies, cleared slums, created 
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new housing schemes, and widened its main streets.137  Similar urban improvements were made 
after World War II.  However, the city council did not have a history of experience in improving 
its town through private-public partnerships or with the advice of local business leaders.   
Part of this was due to the relationship between local politicians and industry.  In Sheffield, local 
politicians were closely tied to the labour unions.  Since 1926, Sheffield had been a steadfast 
Labour party locality.138  As the name suggests, the Labour party was built with union and labour 
interests in mind; a great number of the local representatives in Sheffield “show[ed] tremendous 
solidarity” with the trade unions and fought with them against the corporate leaders of steel 
mills.139 In fact, many of the local politicians were current or former union leaders. 140  As a result, 
the policies of the local city council often favoured the interests of labour over those of private 
enterprise.  Private industry was an adversary to the goals and work of Sheffield leaders. When 
the local area lost its manufacturing jobs, the city council did not have a previous history of 
cooperating with the private sector and had little reason to view public-private partnerships as a 
potentially useful tool.  
b. Sheffield Economic Development Actions 
One of the first „revitalization‟ actions taken by the council was the creation of the Department 
of Employment.  The department was controversial on a national level; it was the first local 
authority to establish such an entity.  Politicians and policy-makers at both the local and national 
levels voiced concerned over the department, as many “believed that employment was [not] an 
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appropriate area for a local authority to be involved in”.141  The problem with the Department of 
Employment was not so much that it was a local authority, but that it proceeded to become a 
massive bureaucracy intent on spending unavailable amounts of public money on economically 
unsound ventures.  There was also a hostility and lack of support for public-private partnerships.  
According to local government sources, the department “could spend 50.000 pounds a month, if 
necessary, without going to a full council meeting for approval”.142 The Department of 
Employment largely focused on „cultural projects‟, in “an attempt to brand Sheffield culture.”143   
However, by investing in cultural projects, the Department was not growing an already strong 
area of the Sheffield economy.  Many of the projects pertained to a very small ethnic minority of 
the community and, even in a best case scenario, very few high paying jobs could have resulted 
from the projects.  Additionally, the project did not address the majority of the unemployed steel 
workers who did not belong to the ethic minority.  Key projects the Department of Employment 
invested in included the National Centre for Popular Music, an “Asian training project, Afro-
Caribbean enterprise centres, and a Pakistani Muslim centre”.144  While potentially contributing 
to social cohesion and cultural understanding, these projects did very little to foster the growth 
of jobs that could replace those lost in the steel manufacturing sector. 
In addition to the Department of Employment, the local government essentially subsidized jobs 
by expanding its own payroll.  In an effort to reduce unemployment, “the council [began] to 
expand and maintain its own employment base… [in order] to cushion the effect of the massive 
loss of steel and engineering jobs”.145   This strategy proved unpopular among local businessmen.  
                                                          
141
 Allender, 84. 
142
 Allender, 84. 
143
 Allender, 86. 
144
 Allender, 85. 
145
 Allender, 86 
55 
 
Many argued that the city council was merely creating jobs to save its own reputation and was 
employing people with economically unproductive busy work.  Although the city council‟s 
expansion did provide employment for a portion of the newly unemployed, it only helped delay 
the harsh economic reality.  It may have proven more advantageous for the city council to simply 
distribute the extra money spent on its expanded payroll to the unemployed and allow them the 
time to search for other jobs or develop new streams of revenue.  By the late 1980s, a large 
percentage of the expanded city council became unemployed again when national rate-cutting 
demanded large amounts of redundancies.146   
Although its forays into „cultural branding‟ were proven unsuccessful, Sheffield decided to try to 
brand itself as a city of sport by hosting the World Student Games in 1991.  Historically, the city 
had little precedent as a „sports‟ capital.  According to a former member of the city council, “the 
decision to host the World Student games [and build the costly stadium] was not made on the 
basis of building upon local sporting activity.  Rather it was almost literally „plucked out of the 
air‟ as an idea to cement the relationship between the council and the private sector and to 
attempt to give Sheffield an international profile”.147  In fact, the proposal came not from an 
economic development committee, but the director of the recreational department in Sheffield.  
The results of the project were less than desirable, and it has been estimated by council sources 
that the venture made a loss of between 10-28 million pounds.148 Significantly, the ill-fated 
decision to host the World Student Games was “made within the context of a much reduced 
overall budget, due to rate-capping, and…it necessitated cuts in basic services such as housing, 
social services and education to finance it.”149  Instead of spending resources on the promotion 
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of education and skills in technology, Sheffield policy-makers built an unprofitable sports 
stadium. 
In the late 1980s, an organization called the Sheffield Development Corporation was formed to 
facilitate public-private partnerships for local economic development.  However, many of the 
projects the SDC facilitated did not address the core economic concerns of Sheffield.  Two 
notable public-private partnerships that Sheffield participated in were the building of 
Meadowhall shopping centre and the South Yorkshire Supertram in the late 1980s, early 1990s.  
Although the city had very little investment in the actual building of Meadowhall, it did invest 
substantial amounts of money in reclaiming the old industrial land tract so that it could be 
developed.  The South Yorkshire Supertram, which connects Sheffield to Meadowhall, received 
funds from all the localities of South Yorkshire in addition to private funding.150  An unfortunate 
consequence of Meadowhall and the Supertram was a hollowing-out of downtown Sheffield‟s 
core commercial district.  By the mid-1990s, Sheffield‟s commercial downtown “resembled a 
ghost town” and lost approximately 20% of its trade by Meadowhall‟s second year.151   The 
Supertram contributed to this hollowing out by facilitating easy transport to the shopping mall.   
Secondly, the economic development value of Meadowhall was questionable at best.  Most of 
the jobs offered by the shopping centre are low-paying, unskilled and insecure.   Sheffield 
unemployment figures do not in themselves give an entirely accurate picture of the city‟s 
economic health since many of the previously unemployed workers are now in low-paying, 
insecure jobs.152  Kostas Georgiou, who compiled the application data for Sheffield‟s successful 
bid for EU Objective One Status in 1998, found that “between 1978 and 1998 average earnings 
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in south Yorkshire fell from above the national average to 12% below it…These [earnings were] 
overwhelmingly in the service sector, many of them in the retail sector at Meadowhall…  By 
1989, 65% of employment was in the service sector compared to 57% in 1981 and 44% in 
1971.”153 Finally, the service sector was not very successful in replacing lost manufacturing jobs.  
During the twenty year period from 1978 to 1998, Sheffield lost a total of 177.000 jobs, while 
gaining 47.000 in the service sector.  In total, Sheffield lost approximately 130.000 jobs. 154   
In recent years, Sheffield has put greater focus on rebuilding their downtown area.  The Heart of 
the City Project was initiated in early 2000.  It is approximately a 120 million pound initiative which 
has helped encourage downtown development and the creation of a variety of public space, such 
as gardens and plazas.155  The city‟s development corporation has also tried to encourage the 
formation of technology clusters by building a science business park.  However, the region still 
suffers from a suburbanized and fragmented spatial composition as well as a lack of high paying 
employment.  There has been what some term a „feminizing‟ of the workforce as women of the 
region are more willing than the men to work in lower-paying, retail jobs.156  Although the city 
has tried in recent years to develop more comprehensive development strategies, it has struggled 
to attract industry and wasted valuable time and resources with its early mistakes. The poorly 
planned development agenda of its early years helped to prolong the economic hardship of 
Sheffield. 
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c. History of Pittsburgh Policy Makers and Development 
After subsidies failed to prevent job loss in Pittsburgh, city officials also began to look for other 
economic solutions.  Unlike Sheffield, however, Pittsburgh had a significant history of public-
private partnerships and urban development projects, which had taken place prior to the decline 
of the steel industry.  This would greatly affect their approach to economic development post-
steel.   
After the Second World War, the city of Pittsburgh embarked on an ambitious and forward-
thinking urban development project named Renaissance.  Renaissance was a reaction to the 
“severely degraded environment [which] so diminished…quality of life that 
corporations…considered moving their headquarters out of Pittsburgh”.157  The project was 
created at a time when the idea of „urban development‟ had not even come into the public‟s 
consciousness and is generally considered a story of success. A key aspect of its success was its 
incorporation of private-public partnerships.158  Two of the early private, non-profit 
development organizations were run by some of the biggest names in Pittsburgh and U.S. 
business.  The Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association was chaired by Howard Heinz, while 
the later formed Allegheny Conference on Community Development was dominated by Richard 
K. Mellon, “heir to the powerful Mellon family financial interests”.159   
Pittsburgh was also the recipient of a great deal of philanthropy from business elites of the area, 
including the Heinz, Carnegie and Mellon Families.  In contrast to Sheffield, many of the 
                                                          
157
 Edward K Muller, "Downtown Pittsburgh: Renaissance and Renewal," Pittsburgh and the Appalachians: 
Cultural and Natural Resources in a Postindustrial Age,  Ed. Joseph L. Scarpaci with Kevin J. Patrick (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006) 8. 
158
 Brian Jacobs, Strategy and Partnership in Cities and Regions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 68-103. 
159
 Muller, "Downtown Pittsburgh: Renaissance and Renewal," Pittsburgh and the Appalachians: Cultural and 
Natural Resources in a Postindustrial Age,  Ed. Joseph L. Scarpaci with Kevin J. Patrick, 8. 
59 
 
development projects completed before and after the decline of steel were supported by 
donations from these elites.160  The Renaissance I project was terminated in 1970 with the election 
of Major Pete Flaherty, who believed that the city‟s money should be directed towards deprived 
neighborhoods, rather than the economic development of the downtown area.  
The previous experience of Renaissance I meant that Pittsburgh policy-makers and business 
leaders had already formed many of the organizations and relationships necessary for economic 
development.  However, Renaissance I also brought serious biases to the development agenda.  
Renaissance I was heavily tied to the Pittsburgh Steel industry and dedicated to the preservation of 
a solid downtown Pittsburgh. It was focused on improving Pittsburgh‟s physical environment, 
but also steadfast on protecting the already-existing spatial composition of the city.161  The mill 
towns of Pittsburgh remained isolated from one another, with main connections only going 
downtown.  As previously discussed, the fragmented region was segregated by ethnicity and 
class. Business and steel leaders believed that connecting these regions would cause more harm 
than good.  Consequently, most business and community leaders failed to recognize “the 
potential benefits of connecting their communities”.162 In the early 1950s, the local Pittsburgh 
government rejected the proposals of state and regional planners to build a system of highways 
which would connect the fragmented Pittsburgh.   City, suburban, and business leaders believed 
that “too much highway infrastructure…would encourage people and commerce to leave the 
city”. 163  However, the region continued to lose population from its core, despite the efforts of 
city leaders, and Pittsburgh became increasingly disconnected. 
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d. Pittsburgh Economic Development Actions 
Renaissance II, spanning from 1977 to 1988, failed to reverse these spatial trends.  The agenda, like 
Renaissance I, was primarily focused on the physical structures of the downtown district.  Early 
projects used private-public partnerships to build a convention center, a light-rail transit line, and 
several large skyrises in the new PPG Place complex.164   Policy-makers continued to promote 
development and zoning restrictions which discouraged suburban industrial development.  These 
policies may have hampered the formation of potential economic clusters.165  The hyper-
concentration of funding on the downtown region also temporarily backfired when “an 
unexpected second wave of corporate restructuring hit Pittsburgh hard in the mid-to-late 
1980,…with the brunt…borne by white-collar workers‟.166  The downsizing of many of 
America‟s top corporations caused “downtown Pittsburgh [to lose] its status as one of the 
nation‟s largest concentrations of Fortune 500 corporate headquarters.167 
The policy-makers focus on the downtown ignored the fragmented spatial composition of 
Pittsburgh and hindered the development of possible suburban industry clusters.  But it also 
formed the appealing downtown that Pittsburgh has today. Cultural projects, like the Andy 
Warhol Museum, built upon Pittsburgh‟s inherent strengths.168 Finally, the city undertook an 
extensive remodeling of the former industrial strip near its city center in the late 1990s. The area 
                                                          
164
 Muller, “Downtown Pittsburgh”,  13. 
165
 Gleeson and Paytas 187. 
166
 Gleeson and Paytas 192, 
167
 Ibid. 
168
 Muller, “Downtown Pittsburgh”, 18.  Pittsburgh is the birthplace of Andy Warhol.  Additionally, the Carnegie 
Art Museum boasts a collection of Van Gogh paintings which were donated by Andrew Carnegie. 
61 
 
was transformed from an industrial warehouse zone to a young, cultural district.169  It is now a 
popular with college students and young professionals. 
Arguably the most important legacy of Pittsburgh‟s regional development efforts has been the 
formation of public-private partnerships with technological and medical research.  One of 
Pittsburgh‟s main industries today is the biotechnology field.  It is in this area that Pittsburgh has 
had success in creating jobs and beginning the transition to a knowledge economy.  Funded by 
philanthropic and state entities in 1983, the Pittsburgh High-Technology Council and the Ben 
Franklin Technology Partnership worked together to help transfer new technologies from 
universities to the marketplace and…created a new agency to provide direct assistance to 
technology entrepreneurs.”170  According to the Ben Franklin Technology Partnership, “from 
1989 to 2001, BFTP boosted the state's economy by $8 billion and helped to create 93,105 job-
years.”171  The BFTP estimates that the state invested only $3.342 per job-year.172   In Pittsburgh 
alone, from 1983 to 1985, “40.000 new jobs …[were] created as the high-tech firm count in the 
city reached an unprecedented count of 415.173  Building on its success, the Pittsburgh High-
Technology Council created the Pittsburgh Biomedical Development Corporation (PBDC) in 
1989. 174  The PBDC has helped local entrepreneurs with the funding necessary for 
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biotechnology startups.  It is important to note that policy-makers used public-private 
partnerships to build on an industrial sector already in existence.  Pittsburgh‟s University of 
Pittsburgh Medical Center and Carnegie Mellon University are both prestigious scientific 
institutions with long histories of cooperation with industry.  The UPMC is today one of the top 
hospitals in the United States and has played home to several renowned researchers, including 
Jonas Salk- the developer the polio vaccine.175 The Pittsburgh High Technology Council and the 
state of Pennsylvania encouraged students in the area to specialize in the technological sciences, 
while simultaneously supporting innovations from individuals and its already-existing 
institutions.176  This combined approach has helped stem the brain drain from the city and 
encouraged the development of an economy focused on the production of knowledge. 
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IX. Sheffield and Pittsburgh in the Knowledge Economy 
The economic restructuring and resulting job loss experienced by Europe and North America in 
the second half of the 20th century forced both workers and policy makers to recognize the 
changes occurring in the global economy.  As jobs became replaced by more efficient machines 
and processes or outsourced to cheaper countries, discussions on the emerging „knowledge-
based economy‟ became increasingly prominent in public discourse.  What is meant by a 
knowledge-based economy?  In a narrow sense, it has been used to refer to the rise of 
information technology (IT) and related industries. Fields such as computer engineering, 
software, information systems, and biotechnology have all been popularly included under the 
„knowledge-economy‟ banner.  But in a broader and more accurate application, a knowledge 
economy includes a vast array of industry.  Whereas a traditional economy relied on inputs such 
as steel or coal, in the new knowledge-based economy “knowledge and information are the main 
inputs and outputs”.177  This development does not only pertain to the service sector, but also to 
areas such as agriculture and manufacturing.178  In these areas, the development of advanced and 
efficient processes replaces the importance of “the physical manufacture of a product”.179   
Because of this change in processes, the economic geography and required resources of the 
knowledge economy fundamentally differ from the traditional, manufacturing economy.   
 
a. The Spatial Composition of the Knowledge Economy 
The suburbanized and fragmented landscape of Pittsburgh and Sheffield is in conflict with the 
spatial characteristics of a successful knowledge economy.  Frances Cairncross famously 
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predicted that the ICT revolution would result in a „death of distance‟, making suburbanization 
more common and dense cities no longer necessary.180 However, economists have become 
increasingly convinced in the positive influence that agglomeration and dense „knowledge 
clusters‟ have on innovation and economic growth.181  According to Leamer and Stormer:  
Previous rounds of infrastructure improvement always have had a double effect, permitting 
dispersion of certain routine activities but also increasing the complexity and time-dependence of 
productive activity, and thus making agglomeration more important.182  
Key to this conclusion is the observation that knowledge is “generated and transmitted more 
efficiently via local proximity”.183  This is most appropriately connected to tacit knowledge.  This 
non-codified, “sticky” knowledge is highly correlated to innovative activity and technological 
advances.184  Additionally, cities can help encourage “knowledge spillovers”, by providing large, 
dense networks of firms who are well connected to local and other regional economies.185   
Sheffield and Pittsburgh acted as clusters for the steel manufacturing industry.  As the industry 
grew, more firms were attracted to these steel hubs, and the number of firms directly or 
indirectly involved with the manufacture of steel increased. However, unlike modern-knowledge 
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economies, the manufacture of the physical product (and, in particular, the input of physical 
natural resources) played a large role in the steel industry cluster.  Manufacturing industries, such 
as steel, tended to cluster in the region of these essential natural resources. This promoted mill 
towns, which were disconnected from a dense core and whose sole existence was dependent on 
a single factory.   
According to current economic geography theory, the suburbanized and fragmented geography 
of Pittsburgh and Sheffield is detrimental to the cities‟ efforts to develop a „knowledge 
economy”.  The two cities‟ economic geographies do not facilitate the transmittance of the 
crucial tacit knowledge needed for innovation.  Although Pittsburgh has historically made many 
efforts to revitalize and enrich its downtown core, it has done little to connect the isolated 
former mill towns.  Additionally, policy-makers may have thwarted new, naturally occurring 
knowledge clusters from developing by discouraging suburban industrial development.  Because 
Sheffield began to focus on the downtown core only in the late 1990s, the area is still deficient in 
some of the architectural and cultural features which make a downtown appealing.    
The city centers of Sheffield and Pittsburgh have not become denser since the failure of their 
region‟s mill towns.  Already suburbanized before the decline of steel, the cities of Pittsburgh 
and Sheffield have consistently lost population as residents continue the suburbanization trend 
or relocate to other areas with better job opportunities.  Pittsburgh, in particular, tried to fight 
these tendencies by constructing transportation development policies that were biased towards 
the downtown.  However, these policies have failed to stem population loss from the core and 
resulted in Pittsburgh continuing to have a fragmented population.   
Labour surveys and studies on the „knowledge-economy‟ emphasize that workers desire “thick 
labour markets” which allow them the potential to switch companies freely.  This is in steep 
contrast to older manufacturing labour markets like the steel industry, where employees would 
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often stay in a location and with a company for their working lives.186  In order to increase the 
availability of jobs and cultivate thick labour markets, a city and its region must be spatially well- 
integrated.  Pittsburgh is one of the few metropolitan areas in the United States without an 
adequate system of highways and remains internally subdivided.  Sheffield has also had to deal 
with problems of fragmentation, but is affected even more so by its relative geographical 
isolation.  It does not possess an airport and its location is inconveniently far from London.  
b. Knowledge Economy Inputs 
Unlike the traditional manufacturing economy, modern knowledge economies do not necessarily 
need to be located near the physical manufacture of their products. According to Florida, the 
one element that knowledge industries absolutely require of a region is large populations of 
highly skilled available labour. In 1999, the then CEO and president of Hewlett-Packard, Carly 
Fiorina, noted the following at an annual meeting: 
We don’t need any more tax incentives.  We don’t need any more big incentive packages. We don’t’ even 
need highway interchanges. Of course, in some instances, we’ll take them. We will go where the highly 
skilled people are. If you have people, we will come to your jurisdiction. If you don’t have people, we can’t 
come no matter how much money you want to pile up and shove in front of us.  We will go where the 
highly skilled people are. 187  
Additionally, Florida and leading economists argue that knowledge workers and knowledge 
companies have a reciprocal build-up effect.  More knowledge workers cause the city to become 
more attractive to companies, and more knowledge-based companies attract more skilled 
workers.   
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With the decline of the steel industry, Pittsburgh and Sheffield were left with a labour force that 
did not have the background necessary to attract or grow a „knowledge economy‟. The largely 
blue-collar working forces, which were “once employable”, now possessed “skills [that] were 
obsolete and unmarketable in a changing economy”.188 In order to create jobs and revive their 
economies, Pittsburgh and Sheffield needed to attract qualified workers, while simultaneously 
growing innovation. 
c. Attracting and Retaining Skilled Workers 
If companies require qualified labour to locate in a city, policy-makers must find ways to attract 
and retain skilled workers.  The quality of life in a city can have a great effect on its ability to 
attract young, skilled labour.  Unlike the often geographically determined industries of steel and 
coal, most „knowledge-based‟ industries do not require placement in near specific natural 
resources or geographic regions.  Richard Florida has noted the importance of an appealing 
environment and atmosphere in attracting both highly trained knowledge workers to a region. 189  
In terms of physical environment, the steel industry has left a legacy air pollution, brownfields, 
empty warehouses and poorly constructed mill towns.  Both Sheffield and Pittsburgh have made 
considerable efforts to “green” their cities.  Pittsburgh, in particular, is well-known for its 
Renaissance I’s success in reducing air pollution.  Sheffield has created several botanical gardens 
and green spaces. Pittsburgh has also remodeled its industrial warehouse district, known as the 
Strip, into “a fashionable district of shops, restaurants, nightclubs”.190  Both Pittsburgh and 
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Sheffield have failed to adequately remodel their former mill towns or better connect them to the 
cities‟ core and the region at large.  Plans to build a metropolitan beltway that would connect 
Pittsburgh‟s lower valley region to the downtown core are still uncompleted. It may be that these 
mill towns, whose formation and existence depended upon the steel industry, are no longer 
viable in a knowledge economy‟s economic geography.   
Lastly, Florida emphasizes the important role that immigration and tolerance of diversity play in 
the attraction of knowledge workers.  It is very common for new economy industries to draw 
from a global labour pool in their search for scarce, highly skilled workers. The Milken Institute 
listed the diversity caused by immigration “as one of the two most powerful demographic trends 
reshaping the nation‟s cities and regions”. 191   The top contenders in its „Melting Pot Metros‟ also 
happened to be the new “hot spots of economic growth.”192   Modern technology firms are well 
known for their workers‟ diversity and employ a large percentage of “foreign-born entrepreneurs 
and technologists”. 193  Because of the diverse nature of knowledge economy workers and 
innovators, it is important that cities looking to attract such labour are tolerant and accepting of 
differences.  Schumpeter, in fact, listed tolerance of diversity as one of his three necessary 
requirements for innovation and economic growth.  Although Pittsburgh was once a major 
attractor of immigrants, it did not make Melting Pot Metros top twenty-one cities list.  Sheffield, 
due to its geographic isolation, mainly attracted immigrants from similar cultural backgrounds.194  
It is significantly less diverse today than other former manufacturing cities such as Manchester 
and Leeds. 
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d. Growing Innovation and Industry 
If industry can only be attracted primarily with skilled labour and the area is struggling to 
revitalize, then it must also find ways to support innovation and grow industry.  According to a 
1996 OECD study, the future of successful OECD economies will revolve „learning clusters‟ and 
technologically advanced production.195  Local universities and research institutions can play an 
important role in the generation of new ideas and processes. But the simple existence of these 
institutions is not enough.  Innovation needs access to the market.  One way to connect 
innovation and funding is through the support of public-private partnerships.  According to 
public policy experts such as Brian Jacobs, the formation of public-private partnerships has been 
one of the most effective local development strategies in recent decades.196 Pittsburgh has 
successfully done this in the area of medical technology.  The seeds for these industries were 
initially planted by entrepreneurs and Carnegie Mellon, University of Pittsburgh, and the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.  However, the city of Pittsburgh facilitated the 
transformation of these ideas into industrial growth by forming public-private partnerships and 
creating mechanisms to provide initial funding.  Unlike Sheffield, Pittsburgh could rely on its 
history of medical innovation and public-private partnerships after the collapse of its steel 
industry employment.  Sheffield began to create form public-private partnerships for 
development in the late 1980s, but most of these early projects were focused on physical 
structures and were not economically beneficial in terms of job creation.  The city has recently 
begun to form more technology-based partnerships, such as the creation of technology parks, 
but enough time has not past for the effects of such partnerships to have fully manifested.    
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X. Unfulfilled Hopes: Failures and Criticisms of the “Knowledge Economy” 
In recent years, Pittsburgh and Sheffield have both sought to brand themselves as a „knowledge 
economy‟. However, what makes a small region or city a “knowledge economy”? There is 
considerable misunderstanding of the term.  Rather than referring to advanced economies‟ 
comparative advantage in knowledge production and application, policy makers and politicians 
have often erroneously interchanged the “knowledge economy” with the IT sector.  Hence, the 
majority of programs in Pittsburgh and Sheffield focused on generating a „knowledge economy‟ 
were related to high tech startups.  
Jean Gadrey is an example of critics who associate a „knowledge economy‟ with the IT sector.  
Gadrey argues that the number of „IT-related jobs” created, as well as secondary jobs created due 
to greater productivity, has been exaggerated by „knowledge economy‟ enthusiasts. 197  Indeed, 
government and think tank reports are guilty of making unrealistic predictions of the „soaring‟ IT 
sector‟s potential for job creation.  In 1998, the Statistical Abstract of the United States estimated 
that new ICT fields would create 8.6 million jobs between 1996 and 2006.  However, Gadry‟s 
calculations, operating within stricter definition of ICT jobs, predict only 1 million jobs at best.198  
The confusion between a “knowledge economy” and an “IT economy” created two key 
problems in the perception and practice of cultivating a „knowledge economy‟. 
First, many policymakers fully believed that transforming their respective cities into mini Silicon 
Valleys was the key to economic revitalization. But there is serious doubt among economists as 
to whether knowledge clusters can be artificially produced through public policy.  This is 
particularly relevant for cities such as Pittsburgh and Sheffield, which have aimed to “create” 
knowledge clusters. New Economic Geography, pioneered by economists such as Paul 
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Krugman, studies the way clusters have formed.  According to Phillip Cooke, “even though 
public bodies may get involved by giving support of various kinds, the dominant cluster 
causation vector is one in which the firms that realize commercialization are mainly funded 
privately, often as risky ventures from which investors expect a generous return”.199 Since the 
„knowledge economy‟ is highly dependent on the generation of new scientific knowledge, 
proximity to leading universities, rival and complementary firms, and research labs has become 
increasingly important.  With a build-on effect, “the critical mass of „stars‟, their disciples, 
research centres, equipment, and trusted contacts make for a remarkable immobility of leader 
scientific research centres”.200 It appears difficult for a city to attract new economy industries 
with little or no base to build upon.  For instance, Pittsburgh‟s health technology cluster arose 
from the city‟s long tradition of hospitals and medicine.  
The second problem relates to employment. Many naïve optimists promised struggling 
manufacturing towns that government programs would “create” a “knowledge economy” that 
could restore towns to their former glory.  Policymakers‟ efforts to create an „IT-centric 
economy‟ have failed to solve the main problem in cities such as Pittsburgh and Sheffield: the 
dearth of well-paid jobs for skilled, labour-orientated workers.  The burgeoning IT sector in 
Pittsburgh and Sheffield has provided some highly paid positions, however such jobs are limited 
and require advanced university education.  Employment opportunities for less educated, trained 
skilled workers have yet to manifest, and much of the labour not directly associated with 
innovation, such as assembly and production, has been outsourced to other countries to keep 
costs low.  
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Reports such as the Department of Commerce‟s “The Emerging Digital Economy” and The 
Statistical Abstract of the US have greatly influenced the mistaken belief that a knowledge 
economy is synonymous with the IT sector. Policy makers and struggling cities, such as 
Pittsburgh and Sheffield, have based much of their regional revitalization plans upon the idea 
that promotion of IT industries will result in booming job growth.  Inaccurate measurements 
and inflated predictions drastically affect a region‟s decision to pour precious financial resources 
into attracting IT industry. The populations of workers and future workers who are negatively 
affected by the transition in the global economy have yet to see any real benefit from this 
bastardized vision of a “knowledge economy”.    
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XI. The “Green Economy”: The New Solution for Struggling Industrial Cities? 
The misunderstanding and misapplication of the „knowledge economy‟ concept has resulted in 
considerable disappoint for former manufacturing regions like Pittsburgh and Sheffield. 
Disillusioned by the lack of quick results and replacement jobs for their constituents, many 
politicians and policymakers are supporting a new „brand‟ of economic revitalization: the “green” 
manufacturing economy. A key feature of the “green economy” is the promotion of high paying 
jobs that require semi-skilled workers, are environmentally friendly and utilize specialized, state 
of the art technologies.  Underpinning the movement is the hope that the establishment of 
“green industries” such as renewable energy production and equipment manufacturing, would 
adequately provide jobs for those that would have otherwise been employed in the steel and 
manufacturing sector.  A second feature of the „green job‟ sector, as envisioned by proponents, is 
its relative inability to be outsourced to other countries.  Although foreign companies are 
currently the main investors in American and British renewable energy, the hope is that the 
creation of a renewable utility industry would result in jobs which cannot be outsourced due to 
the technological restrictions and needs of energy creation and storage grids.  
The rhetoric, discussions, and public policy have largely taken place in the United States, Europe 
and the United Nations, and the following section will examine this new trend by identifying its 
origins, theory, core aims, and requirements.  This discussion is highly relevant to the topic of 
revitalization of former industrial towns. Sheffield has stated its interest in pursuing green 
initiatives, but has done little in the area so far. As such the potential for a „green economy‟ in 
Sheffield cannot be evaluated in any detail.   However, the greater Pittsburgh region has already 
begun to work towards creating a “green economy” and has invested significant resources.  But 
coupled with the great enthusiasm for a green economy is equally strong criticism.  A recent 
study on Spain‟s publicly subsidize renewable energy industry argues that the results have been 
disastrous and have, in fact, caused job loss.  This study is particularly interesting since Europe, 
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and especially Spain, has been used as a template for how to encourage such an industry in the 
United States. Finally, the promises of the „green economy‟‟ will be analyzed within the context 
of Pittsburgh and Sheffield‟s revitalization histories and present needs.  
a. The Green Economy: Origins and Concepts 
The idea of developing an environmentally-friendly economy has existed for years.  Academic 
fields such as environmental economics have emerged in recent years in response to a growing 
interest in building environmental protections and safeguards into the global economy. However, 
the idea of a „green new deal‟ – a widespread economic recovery plan centered around renewable 
energy manufacturing and other „green jobs‟- is new. The concept has become popular in the 
United States on the national level and in the United Nations on the global level, and has already 
been instituted in parts of Europe.  This popularity is largely due to three important trends: 
increased concern over carbon emissions (in relation to global warming), energy independence, 
and the economic malaise caused by the housing bubble and financial speculation.  American 
President Barack Obama made proposals for a „green new deal‟, which would “create millions of 
additional jobs and entire new industries”, as one of the central features of his campaign.201  On 
the global level, the United Nations has commissioned several in-depth studies on the impact 
that renewable energy and environmental regulation could have on national economies, with a 
particular emphasis on poverty-reduction in some of the world‟s most deprived nations.202  The 
European Union has already adopted many „green policies‟ and Germany and Spain lead in the 
development of a renewable energy industry. 
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The American think tank, the Center for American Progress, has been one of the most vocal 
proponents of a „green recovery‟ plan for the United States, as proposed by Barack Obama.  In 
collaboration with the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), they published a report 
entitled “Green Recovery: A Program to Create Good Jobs and Start Building a Low-Carbon 
Economy”.203  The report proposes a “green economic recovery program [that] would spend 
$100 billion dollars…and could be paid for with proceeds from auctions of carbon permits 
under a greenhouse cap-and-trade program”.204  PERI estimates that the “fiscal expansion would 
create 2 million jobs”.205 The proposal focuses on six areas of investment for the nation:  
1. retrofitting buildings to improve energy efficiency 
2. Expanding mass transit and freight rail 
3. Constructing „smart‟ electrical grid transmission systems 
4. Wind power 
5. Solar power 
6. Next-generation biofuels206 
 
The development of renewable energy technologies and production is a key feature of „green 
economy‟ proposals. PERI suggests that such progress be encouraged through “public funds, tax 
credits, and loan guarantees to spur private-sector investment”.207  The report argues that a 100 
billion dollar investment in the green energy sector would result in a greater number of jobs for 
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skilled workers, lower unemployment, stimulus for the construction and manufacturing sectors, 
more stable oil prices, and “self-financing energy efficiency”.208  
 
Although plans for a „green‟ economic initiative have been introduced on the global and national 
levels, proposals within the United States have placed special emphasis on the possible positive 
effects that a policy could have the country‟s struggling industrial towns.   The term “green-
collared job” has been used to describe the type of employment that could be created by a „green 
new deal‟ initiative.  According to proponents of the plan, “green collar jobs” would be similar to 
“blue-collar” jobs except that the jobs would be related to renewable energy or other 
environment-friendly work, such as building retrofitting.   
 
It is hoped that „green-collar jobs‟ would adequately replace those formerly held in the steel and 
automotive manufacturing industries. An „adequate” replacement job would be one that required 
specially-trained workers, similar high pay, and an aversion toward outsourcing.209  Such a 
proposal is incredibly popular among former manufacturing industry workers and struggling 
towns such as Pittsburgh.  Groups like the Blue Green Alliance, “a partnership between the 
United Steelworkers and the Sierra Club” are enthusiastic about „green new deal‟ and see greater 
amounts of steel being manufactured for technologies such as wind turbines.210  Increasingly, 
„green jobs‟ are gaining support from traditional manufacturing workers and, especially, 
policymakers from struggling regions. 
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b. Pittsburgh: Growing a “Green Economy” 
Convinced that renewable energy is the key to their towns‟ revitalization, some policy leaders 
have already begun wooing industry leaders to their regions through subsidies and tax 
exemptions. Notably, the Pittsburgh region is one of the most prominent.  Pittsburgh has heavily 
invested public resources into the renewable energy field.  As a result, prominent conferences on 
renewable energy have been held in the city, and companies, especially foreign subsidiaries, have 
come to invest in the Pittsburgh and greater Pennsylvania region.211  
 
Little progress in the area of renewable energy had been made until Governor Ed Rendell came 
into office in 2003.  He envisioned a renewable energy policy that would help Pennsylvania grow 
a specialized industry that in turn would attract high paying jobs.  In particular, it is the goal of 
such policies to fill the void of former high paying jobs in the steel and manufacturing industries. 
The state‟s policies have garnered considerable attention on a national and international scale.212  
Key to Pennsylvania‟s new energy policy is a set of regulations regarding energy portfolios.   
Pennsylvania has “established the nation's most progressive alternative energy portfolio standard, 
ensuring that 18 percent of all energy generated comes from clean, efficient sources by the year 
2020. Benefits include $10 billion in increased output, $3 billion in additional earnings and as 
many as 4.000 new jobs for residents over the next 20 years”. 213 In terms of renewable,  current 
policy dictates that “8% of the electricity sold at retail in the state [must] come from renewable 
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resources by 2021, including 0.5% from solar photovoltaics”. Additionally, Pennsylvania now 
requires all state government buildings to draw twenty percent of its electricity from “green” or 
renewable energy sources. 214    
 
These regulations work in conjunction with massive grant and incentive programs, at least 
partially funded through taxpayer dollars. The Pennsylvania Energy Harvest Grant Program “has 
awarded $15.9 million and leveraged another $43.7 million in private funds [for renewable 
energy] since its inception in May 2003. 215  The Pennsylvania Department of Community and 
Economic Development offers “competitive incentive packages composed of loans, loan 
guarantees, and grants…to renewable energy manufactures” and the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection gives “over $20 million in annual grant money…for alternative 
energy projects”. 216  
Starting in February 2007, the state has accelerated their financial support of the renewable 
energy industry. The Energy Independence Strategy, proposed by the governor, aims “to manage 
energy costs, move toward energy independence and stimulate the economy”. 217  The state has 
committed to a “$665.9 million investment to spur the development of alternative and renewable 
energy technologies and help customers and small businesses take steps to reduce their electricity 
                                                          
214
 The Pennsylvania Department of State, “Energy Security: The Pennsylvania Story”, 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/pollprev/PDF/Energy_Security_chart_rev.pdf.  Accessed on June 
15, 2009. 
215
 The Pennsylvania Department of State, “Energy Security: The Pennsylvania Story”, 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/pollprev/PDF/Energy_Security_chart_rev.pdf.  Accessed on June 
15, 2009. 
216
 Council of American States in Europe, “Pennsylvania: Energy/Renewables” http://www.case-
europe.com/stateindustries/stateindustry/EnergyRenewablesPennsylvania,114.aspx#Industries (Accessed 
June 16, 2009. 
217
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “Pennsylvania’s Energy Independence”, 
http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/energindependent/cwp/view.asp?a=3&Q=518171&energindependentNav=|(
Accessed on June 13, 2009). 
79 
 
consumption and save money”. 218 Approximately  $428.4 million will be used to encourage “the 
development of alternative energy resources and create good-paying, skilled jobs.”219 
 
To date, the Pittsburgh region and the state of Pennsylvania have been somewhat successful in 
growing and attracting renewable energy business.  The most prominent victory was the state‟s 
success in getting Gamesa Corp., a Spanish wind turbine manufacturer, to establish its U.S. 
headquarters in Pennsylvania.  Gamesa is the “second largest wind energy company in the 
world”. 220 It maintains two factories in Pennsylvania, employing over 1,300 workers.221 In 
addition to Gamesa, smaller companies have been attracted to the region. Green Mountain Solar 
and Sun Power Electric teemed up to provide solar electricity to the greater Pittsburgh region. 
Companies from Germany and Taiwan are involved in the solar industry in Pennsylvania. 222 
 
Although Gamesa and other smaller companies have provided some jobs to the Pittsburgh 
region and Pennsylvania as a whole, it is too soon to tell how effective the state‟s policies will be 
in stimulating the dragging economy of Pittsburgh and other steel towns. Many remain hopeful 
that the enormous resources being poured into the venture will be effective.  However, there are 
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many critics of such policies.   According to these critics, Pennsylvania‟s initiatives and 
investments in renewable energy may even hurt struggling economies like Pittsburgh.  
 
c. Critiques on the „Green New Deal‟ 
According to „green economy‟ proposals, the central aim of such programs is to revitalize the 
economy through the creation of well-paid jobs.  Pittsburgh and the state of Pennsylvania have 
based their major investments in the renewable energies industry on this premise.  However, this 
claim is refuted by a recent study on Spain‟s subsidization of its renewable energy industry. 
Startlingly, it claims that more jobs have been destroyed than created by Spain‟s renewable 
energy programs. Spain‟s support for a renewable energy industry mirrors Pennsylvania‟s efforts 
in many ways.  This is due to the fact that Pennsylvania based their program largely on European 
policies.   
 
Continental Europe is far ahead of the United States and Britain in developing a renewable 
energy industry. In fact, the link between „green jobs‟ and increased employment was first 
discussed in 1997, when a White Paper presented by the European Commission predicted that 
500.000- 900.000 jobs would be created through public support of renewable energy.223  Since 
1997, several European governments have taken action towards promoting „green energy.  Spain 
is noted for its particularly aggressive commitment in terms of legislation and monetary 
commitment. Created in cooperation with Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and MITRE, the “Study 
of the Effects on Employment of Public Aid to Renewable Energy Sources” examines what it 
terms the „Spanish Renewables Bubble‟.  According to the authors, the “Spanish experience [in 
renewables] is [currently] considered a leading example to be followed by many policy advocates 
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and politicians”, but the study marks the “first time a critical analysis of the actual performance 
and impact has been made” of the program.224  The study argues that the “Spanish/EU –style 
„green jobs‟ agenda now being promoted in the US in fact destroys jobs”.225 Like the United 
States, and smaller entities like Pennsylvania and the Pittsburgh region, politicians in Spain and 
Europe argued that “massive public support [for the renewable energy industry] would produce 
large numbers of green jobs”.226  But according to the study, the majority of jobs created by 
Spain‟s policies were short-term in nature: construction, installation, and administrative.  Only 
“one out of ten jobs has been created at the more permanent level of actual operation and 
maintenance of the renewable sources of electricity.”227  The collected figures show that the 
subsidies applied since 2000 “have created less than 50.200 jobs”, which is “.2% of Spain‟s 
workforce and .25% of Spain‟s employed workforce”.228 
 
These figures do not reveal the entire effect of Spain‟s subsidy program. A commonly 
overlooked aspect of the “job creation” figures is the relationship between newly created „green 
jobs‟ and jobs that would be destroyed because of renewable energy policies.229 The study on 
Spain is the first of its kind to look at this relationship. According to the study, the creation of 
green jobs in Spain “resulted in the destruction of nearly 110.000 jobs elsewhere in the economy, 
or 2.2 jobs destroyed for every „green job‟ created”.230  Most of these jobs were lost in 
“metallurgy, non-metallic mining, and food processing, beverage, and tobacco”.231  
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The financial costs for Spain have been exorbitant. As estimated by the study, the “total 
overcost- the amount paid over the cost that would result from buying electricity generated by 
the renewable power plants at the market price- that has been incurred from 2000 to 
2008…amounts to 7.918,54 million Euros” or approximately $10 billion US dollars”.232 When 
other subsidies for the industry are added in, the total amounts to 28.671 Euros or $36 billion US 
dollars.  In order to pay down this debt, Spanish consumers would need to pay 31% more for 
their energy costs or face general tax increases.233  Additionally, high energy costs from the 
policies have resulted in energy intensive companies, like Spain‟s Acerinox, relocating to reduce 
costs.234  Lastly, in spite of the massive amounts of resources spent, Spain‟s photovoltaic industry 
“failed to even reach 1% of Spain‟s total electricity production in 2008”.235 
 
The study produced on Spain‟s publicly-funded renewable energy industry is highly relevant to 
Pittsburgh and Sheffield.  Although Sheffield has yet to attempt such a plan, green job proposals 
are becoming increasingly popular on the public policy level and will most likely affect Sheffield 
in the near future. Pittsburgh is in the midst of recreating a system similar to Spain. As part of a 
larger, Pennsylvania state initiative, the Pittsburgh region is currently participating in a subsidy 
and regulatory system based on those instituted in Spain, Germany, and other EU countries.  If 
we look at a Spain‟s „green job‟ policy from an employment perspective, it has largely been a 
failure.  This does not mean that such an industry will fail to create positive benefits in the long 
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term.  The formation of “green” energy industries could produce important environmental 
benefits, such as reductions in CO2 emissions and the use of fossil fuels.  However, in terms of 
regional economic development, heavy subsidization of a renewable energy industry may not be 
the best policy for “Rust Belt” cities such as Pittsburgh and Sheffield. 
 
d. The Rhetoric and Branding of the Green Economy 
In addition to the discussion on costs and job creation, it is important to quickly examine the 
rhetoric surrounding the „green job‟ proposals. Many discussions about the „green economy‟ 
seemed based on little fact and are eerily similar in rhetoric to previous speculation on the 
possibilities of the „knowledge economy‟.  Lois Quam, managing director for alternative energy 
investments at the investment bank Piper Jaffray, was quoted, in reference to renewable energy, 
as saying:  
When I first started looking in to this area, many people commented on how this will be 
as big as the Internet. But this is so much bigger than the Internet.  The only comparable 
example we can find is the Industrial Revolution.  It will affect very business and every 
industry.236 
 
Such rhetoric is common and reminiscent of the „one solution fits all‟ discussions surrounding 
the „knowledge economy‟.   While the U.S. and UK lag behind countries such as Germany, 
Spain, and Japan in technology development, the issue in relation to cities like Pittsburgh and 
Sheffield  is not technology; it is job and wealth creation.  Interestingly, Pennsylvania has cited its 
frustration with the United States‟ pace at adopting subsidy programs as the main reason for its 
state-wide adoption of „green job‟ policies.  Although it is impossible to make any direct 
comparisons, the history of Spain‟s renewable energy industry suggests that Pennsylvania‟s large 
investment in renewables may be disappointing in terms of job creation. Pittsburgh is 
successfully branding itself as a burgeoning “green economy” because of its investments.  
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However, other than a manufacturing labour force, both Pittsburgh and Sheffield lack an initial 
base upon which this new industry can be built.  Policymakers and residents continue to hope 
that a single industry can replace steel with similar high-paying, manufacturing jobs.  The history 
of the global economy indicates that this is unlikely as diversification of the economy becomes 
increasingly prevalent. Additionally, the short history of the publicly funded renewable energy 
industry does not support the assertion that such an industry will result in large-scale 
employment opportunities.  
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XII. Conclusion: The Future of Economic Development in Pittsburgh and 
Sheffield  
The current economic statuses of Sheffield and Pittsburgh are closely linked to the cities‟ 
manufacturing pasts.  The manufacturing steel industry was initially attracted to the cities because 
of their natural resources and topography.  Sheffield and Pittsburgh developed in conjunction 
with their respective steel industries and the landscapes of the regions adapted to the industries‟ 
needs.  As a result, the two cities became suburbanized, fragmented, and overly-specialized in 
steel.   
When the steel industry declined, the economic logic of Sheffield and Pittsburgh‟s geography 
disappeared. Policy-makers tried to remedy the situation by artificially prolonging the life of 
inefficient steel mills.  When the subsidies ceased, Sheffield and Pittsburgh were unprepared for 
the sudden and exacerbated restructuring of their economies.  Differing economic development 
policies sent the two cities down slightly different economic paths.  While Sheffield failed to 
develop early public-private partnerships and long-term development plans, Pittsburgh 
succeeded in working with private industry and encouraging the creation of a health technology 
cluster.  Despite these differences, both cities are still hindered by their spatial compositions and 
primarily blue-collar labour forces.  Pittsburgh and Sheffield have repeatedly failed to address 
these issues from their manufacturing past.  Perhaps, most significantly, neither city has 
relinquished the hope of regaining its reputation as an economic powerhouse.  Previously known 
across the globe as “Steel Cities”, Pittsburgh and Sheffield have struggled to rebrand themselves 
as economic leaders- first as a leading “Knowledge Economy” and now as a “Green Economy”.   
The key to Pittsburgh and Sheffield‟s economic progress, however, may be in accepting the 
reality of their respective histories and current economic situations.  The great transformations 
of the twentieth century global economy transformed the economic geography of the world. In 
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the United States and Britain, other regions rose to economic power as cities like Pittsburgh and 
Sheffield lost significance. One economist, Professor Tim Leunig of the London School of 
Economics, has gone so far as to suggest to that struggling cities in Britain give up any hope of 
true revitalization.  In his study “Cities Unlimited”, Leunig argues that such cities have lost their 
economic and geographical logic and show little promise of being powerful in the modern 
economy. 237  Instead, he suggests that the government limit its economic renewal funds and, 
instead, encourage residents to migrate to strong hubs like London to take advantage of the 
economic clusters and interactions.   
While an “abandoning” of Sheffield or Pittsburgh is hardly politically feasible, and possibly 
unwise, there is some important truth in Leunig‟s argument.  It is improbable that Pittsburgh or 
Sheffield will regain their former population numbers or economic dominance.  That hope is not 
only naïve, but damaging. As seen in the experiences of Sheffield and Pittsburgh, the intentional 
preservation of outdated economic structures and misguided policies exacerbated an already 
difficult economic situation. Instead of once again developing an economy based on a single 
industry, Pittsburgh and Sheffield may benefit from actively diversifying.  According to 
economist Gregory Hamilton, broad-based economies are better equipped to weather changes in 
the increasingly global economy.  With a diverse economy,  “one area of  a region‟s “economy 
[can] go south, [and] another can pick up the slack”.238  While a diversified economy helps a 
region avoid industry specific economic busts, it also tends to preclude industry-specific 
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economic booms.239  However, in the cases of Pittsburgh and Sheffield, the cities may derive 
more value from a steady, diversified economy than a risk-orientated, single-industry economy.   
The economic histories of Pittsburgh and Sheffield demonstrate the dangers of denial and 
delusion in urban economic planning.  The cities may never again be world-famous, economic 
hubs.  However, with an understanding of their economic pasts and a wise, but modest, 
approach to development, it may be possible for Pittsburgh and Sheffield to overcome their 
“steel hangovers” and develop diverse economies which serve their existing populations. 
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Human Rights Workshop and Youth Programs Coordinator       
 Work with residents of Dutch Government asylum seeker camp. 
 Research asylum cases  
 Create recreational programs for children of all ages and organize a human rights’ workshop. 
 Work with international volunteers and language barriers.   
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DISNEYLAND, Anaheim, CA                                                                                       January 2003 - June 2006  
Entertainment Host 
 Act as liaison between guests and entertainment employees. Work with a multilingual, international 
cliental. 
 Diffuse conflicts and developed creative solutions to problems 
 Work collaboratively to address guest concerns and questions about the department and characters 
 Make risk assessments and quick decisions concerning guest safety, satisfaction, and conflicts within a fast 
paced environment. 
 
SOR PRODUCTIONS, Hollywood, CA                                                                                  December 2004 - June 2005 
Research, Development, and Marketing Intern 
 Conduct detailed research for various documentary subjects, such as mail order Russian brides in America. 
 Develop marketing materials and create client contacts for newly released documentary films in the 
educational market 
 Correspond with university academic departments and officials across the nation in regards to viewing and 
purchasing films.   
 Produce detailed transcripts of conducted interviews and create editing logs. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, Los Angeles, CA                   December 2003- December 2004    
Academic Tutor      
 Provide comprehensive overview of historical theory, concepts, and researching skills. 
 Arrange weekly meetings with multiple tutees.  
 Develop successful test-taking strategies for mid-terms and finals. 
 
RECENT EXTRACURRICULARS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, STUDENT-STAFF COMMITTEE, LSE 
Chairperson 
Chairing meetings on the department’s curriculum, administrative policies, and recruitment efforts. 
 
INVESTMENT SOCIETY, LSE 
Attending Investment workshops and panels 
 
LSE WOMEN IN BUSINESS SOCIETY, LSE 
Organizing seminars and panels addressing successful strategies for women in business. 
     
ADVOCATES FOR ASYLUM REFORM , UCLA      
Co-founder and Chairman.   
Advocating policy change and providing the UCLA community with opportunities to work with asylum seekers.   
 
DARFUR ACTION COMMITTEE, UCLA      
Steering Committee and Legislative Liaison 
 
POLARIS PROJECT, UCLA CHAPTER       
Educating the community on human trafficking and creating outreach programs.   
 
ELIZABETH GLASER PEDIATRIC AIDES FOUNDATION    
DANCE MARATHON, UCLA CHAPTER 
Fundraising and outreach. 
 
 
Language Skills:   English: Native Speaker 
   German: Intermediate (Spoken), Basic (Written) 
          French:  Intermediate (Written), Basic (Spoken) 
           
 
